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Abstract 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of Central Asia 
faced numerous challenges. These included cultivating new national identities and state capacity, 
managing new borders, and addressing issues of conflict and political violence. Converging with 
these challenges – a booming trade in opium and heroin originating in neighboring Afghanistan. 
Central Asia quickly became a key route for opiates originating in Afghanistan and transiting to 
Russia and Europe. The Kyrgyz Republic lies at the southeastern corner of this region, along one 
of the world’s busiest drug trafficking routes. 
This thesis examines state and societal responses to narcotics trafficking in the Kyrgyz 
Republic with a specific emphasis on the role of ethnicity, religion, kinship, and patronage 
networks. In doing so, it seeks to discern the role played by narcotics trafficking in the broader 
political-geographic space of the Republic, paying specific attention to state capacity. Likewise, 
it is interested in how these processes both shape and are shaped by political-geographic space. It 
relies on publicly available data provided by the Kyrgyz Government as well as the UNODC. 
More importantly, it derives context from a series of interviews and observations obtained during 
fieldwork in the Kyrgyz Republic during the summer of 2018. These interviews – conducted 
with officials from academia, non-governmental organizations, international governmental 
organizations, diplomatic missions, and the Kyrgyz government, provide critical context to 
broader research efforts and previous work conducted on this subject.  
This thesis ultimately supports some recent scholarship conducted on narcotics 
trafficking in the Republic, while also challenging the premises of older discourse on the drug 
trade in the region. In doing so it hopes to reinvigorate scholarship and policy debates on the 
Eurasian narcotics trade and broader illicit geographies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2019 by Christopher George Cowan 
All Rights Reserved 
  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis represents a body of work which would not have been possible without the 
support of those around me. It is difficult to note my gratitude with brevity, and those 
acknowledged are but a small number of those who have helped me along the way. 
I owe special thanks to the University of Arkansas, specifically the Department of 
Geosciences, for their continued support. I am likewise grateful for the support of Dr. Kelly 
Hammond and Dr. Adnan Haydar, who have continued to support me in my ongoing endeavors. 
Most importantly, I extremely thankful for the support of the King Fahd Center, whose backing 
enabled this research among many other academic endeavors.  
I likewise owe considerable thanks to those who helped me over the course of my 
fieldwork; without such assistance, fieldwork would have been impossible. This includes the 
Central Asian Studies Institute at the American University of Central Asia - especially Aida and 
Aigul. I would like to especially thank those who participated in interviews, as well as those who 
provided contacts and guidance during the process. Finally, I am indebted to my interpreter, Mrs. 
Ainura Sulaimanova, for helping to facilitate and translate interviews. 
Seven weeks on the ground in Kyrgyzstan is a seemingly short period of time given the 
two-year breadth of this project. There are countless others who have assisted me over the past 
two years - namely members of my cohort, department faculty and staff, and numerous friends 
across multiple states. Without their support and camaraderie this thesis would not have been 
possible. In this regard, I owe special thanks to Nani Verzon and Hilary Zedlitz - friendships 
from which I have greatly benefited personally, professionally, and intellectually. I owe even 
greater thanks to my family; your love and encouragement are invaluable and infinitely 
appreciated. Thank you for supporting me in everything I do.  
 
 
To the members of my committee - Dr. Fiona Davidson, Dr. Thomas Paradise, and Dr. 
Jeff Ryan (Jefe) – thank you for personal and academic support, guidance, and willingness to 
discuss matters academic or otherwise. I always enjoyed our classes and meetings; I likewise 
look forward to our continuing relationship. 
Finally, and most importantly, I owe special thanks to Dr. Ted Holland - who has 
provided support, guidance, mentorship, and encouragement at every step of the process. I 
sincerely appreciate being treated as a peer and equal partner. The past two years have been as 
challenging as they have been enriching. Based on your guidance and mentorship I am now a 
better scholar and researcher than I could have ever previously imagined.  
  
 
 
Dedication 
This thesis is dedicated to my grandfather, George, who always loved learning. 
  
 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter I: Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1  
Research Questions ..................................................................................................................... 2  
Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions ............................................................................. 3  
Terminology and Definitions ...................................................................................................... 5  
Chapter I Summary ..................................................................................................................... 8  
Chapter II: Drugs, Insurgents, and States ..................................................................................... 10  
A Geography of Drug Trafficking ............................................................................................ 10  
Insurgents, Criminals, and Terrorists ........................................................................................ 23 
Defining the State ...................................................................................................................... 27  
Defining State Capacity ............................................................................................................ 32  
Conclusion: Chapter II .............................................................................................................. 53  
Chapter III: Site Survey ................................................................................................................ 55  
Asie Centrale ............................................................................................................................. 55  
Mackinder’s Pivot ..................................................................................................................... 56  
At the Edge of Empire ............................................................................................................... 58  
The Kyrgyz Republic as a Place ............................................................................................... 59 
A Brief History of Kyrgyzstan .................................................................................................. 61 
Mongols, Tsars, and Soviets ..................................................................................................... 62  
Nationalism Rekindled .............................................................................................................. 64  
 
 
Violence and Independence ...................................................................................................... 67  
The Switzerland of the East? ..................................................................................................... 70  
Revolution ................................................................................................................................. 76  
Echoes of 1990 .......................................................................................................................... 80  
Kyrgyzstan as a Space ............................................................................................................... 89  
Central Asia and Post-Soviet..................................................................................................... 89  
Transition, Transit, and Exchange............................................................................................. 93  
Contested Space ........................................................................................................................ 94  
Place, Space, and Capacity ........................................................................................................ 99  
Conclusion: Chapter III ........................................................................................................... 105  
Chapter IV: Research Design and Methodology ........................................................................ 106  
Rationale: Field Interviews ..................................................................................................... 106 
Research Design and Overview of Fieldwork......................................................................... 107 
Rationale: Cartographic Representation.................................................................................. 110  
Overview of Data Collection and Review of Data Collected ................................................. 111 
Data Treatment ........................................................................................................................ 112  
Conclusion: Research Design and Methodology .................................................................... 113 
Chapter V: Findings .................................................................................................................... 114  
Trends in Trafficking .............................................................................................................. 114 
The Spatial Nature of Trafficking and Responses .................................................................. 116 
 
 
State and Societal Responses to Narcotics Trafficking ........................................................... 118  
Competing Narratives ............................................................................................................. 124  
Spatial and Temporal Trends from Data ................................................................................. 126 
Analysis and Discussion: Narratives, Spatial Trends, and State Capacity.............................. 129  
Conclusion: Chapter V ............................................................................................................ 134  
Chapter VI: Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 135  
Summary of Research Findings .............................................................................................. 135  
Key Considerations and Future Research ............................................................................... 137 
Works Cited ................................................................................................................................ 140  
Appendix ..................................................................................................................................... 162  
Appendix A: Table of Acronyms ............................................................................................ 162 
Appendix B: Map of the Central Asia - 2002 ......................................................................... 163 
Appendix C: Map of the Kyrgyz Republic - 2005 .................................................................. 163 
Appendix D: Ethnic Diversity in the Kyrgyz Republic (2017) ............................................... 165 
Appendix E: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in the Kyrgyz Republic (2009) ......................... 166 
Appendix F: 2010 Violence in Osh ......................................................................................... 167 
Appendix G: Police Corruption .............................................................................................. 168  
Appendix H: Sheep and Ladas ................................................................................................ 169  
Appendix I: Views of Kyrgyz Citizens on the Collapse of the USSR .................................... 170 
Appendix J: Manas .................................................................................................................. 171  
 
 
Appendix K: IRB Approval .................................................................................................... 172  
Appendix L: Drug Graffiti ...................................................................................................... 173  
Appendix M: Total Drug Seizures in 2011 & 2014 ................................................................ 174  
1 
 
Chapter I: Introduction 
 Central Asia has long been a fixture for trafficking of Afghan opiates, which account for 
over 90% of the global heroin supply.1 Opiates flowing along the “northern route,” transit the 
Central Asian Republics or Transcaucasia before entering Russia and Eastern Europe. While 
only accounting for five percent of global seizures in 2015, Russian authorities have claimed that 
up to twenty percent of heroin seized in Russia is trafficked along this route.2 
 This research is concerned with the effects of trafficking on the political geography of 
Central Asia. Namely, it seeks to discern the influence of factors including kinship, ethnicity, and 
religious affiliation as they pertain to narcotics trafficking and subsequent responses in the 
Kyrgyz Republic. More importantly, this research is concerned with the role of trafficking and 
responses as they pertain to political geography and state capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic, with a 
special emphasis on how these processes both manifest spatially and in turn shape space.  
In terms of situating this work, this research examines a subject – transnational narcotics 
trafficking – often overlooked within political geography and Middle East Studies. It furthermore 
examines this subject in the context of themes and discourses common within regional studies of 
both Southwest and Central Asia. More importantly, this research contributes to a body of 
literature which has remained sporadic in its treatment of this issue, with periodic shifts in 
interest and disinterest dating to the 1990s. It likewise incorporates mixed methodology – 
cartographic representation and field interviews – which are also lacking in existing literatures. 
                                                 
1 Tom Bowman, “Afghan Governor Wants Government To Control Poppy Crop,” NPR.org, accessed February 7, 
2019, https://www.npr.org/2016/07/06/484894669/afghan-governor-wants-government-to-control-poppy-crop. 
2 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, World Drug Report 2017 (Set of 5 Booklets). (Vienna, 
Austria: UNITED NATIONS, 2017), https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/index.html. 
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In doing so, it hopes to reinvigorate scholarly discussions of the Eurasian drug trade within the 
discipline of political geography. Beyond academia, this research aims to serve as publicly 
accessible scholarship on the Eurasian drug trade. In doing so, it hopes to challenge 
commonplace misconceptions and serve as a resource for analysts and policymakers working on 
efforts related to US policy in Southwest and Central Asia. 
Research Questions 
 This thesis explores the topic of narcotics trafficking and state capacity the Kyrgyz 
Republic through a series of research questions. They are as follows: 
● How do religious, ethnic, or kinship affiliations affect state and societal responses to 
narcotics trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic? 
● How do narcotics trafficking and subsequent responses impact state capacity in the 
Kyrgyz Republic?  
● How do both processes manifest spatially? 
 The first question draws upon many of the continuing challenges faced by the Kyrgyz 
Republic in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. These issues are but a handful 
of the challenges faced by the Republic, but also among the most pronounced. The second 
question assumes that the process of narcotics trafficking plays a key role in shaping state 
capacity in the Republic. While the notion of state capacity is somewhat of a connotative 
chimera - as will be discussed in Chapter II - assessing the effects of the narcotics trade on state 
capacity is crucial to understanding the political geography of Kyrgyzstan. Likewise, assessing 
state capacity is critical to understanding responses to the narcotics trade. Finally, as a piece of 
scholarship in geography it is vital to relate how these processes manifest spatially – namely, 
how do both processes shape the broader political-geographic space of Kyrgyzstan?  
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Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions 
This thesis represents an attempt to answer these questions in the context of research 
conducted over a two-year period. As such, this thesis was drafted with a clear set of limitations, 
delimitations, and assumptions. Limitations include the limited scope of field interviews and 
access to data. In short, field interviews presented unique challenges, as did obtaining 
quantitative data. These challenges - further detailed in Chapter III - were addressed to the fullest 
extent possible considering exigent circumstances. 
 Regarding delimitations, the scope of this research is limited to the Kyrgyz Republic. 
While the intent of this research is to provide a framework for conducting further research in 
Southwest and Central Asia on the relationship between crime, political violence, and state 
capacity, this thesis limits its focus to a single country. This consideration was influenced by 
concerns of research feasibility, cost, ease of access, available resources and contacts, and 
researcher safety.  Future research intends to address these questions over a broader geographic 
context, if possible. 
 This thesis operates under several assumptions - many of which were directly influenced 
by fieldwork. Foremost, this thesis assumes that the narratives collected during the course of 
fieldwork represent a specific, limited perspective in terms of the research questions being 
assessed - what Sally Cummings and Ole Norgaard term a “critical case subset.”3 The 
breakdown of these perspectives based on metadata – interviewee, location, date, language, etc. -  
will be detailed in Chapter IV. As will be discussed in Chapter V, one of the major challenges 
                                                 
3 Sally N. Cummings and Ole Nørgaard, “Conceptualising State Capacity: Comparing Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,” 
Political Studies 52, no. 4 (December 2004): 692, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00503.x. 
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presented at the conclusion of fieldwork was deciphering competing narratives presented by the 
perspectives of interviewees.  
Fieldwork also proved useful in developing assumptions regarding the integrity of 
available quantitative data. Namely, as a result of fieldwork this thesis assumes that open-access 
data detailing annual drug seizures in Kyrgyzstan and the region at large represent a small 
fraction of what is being trafficked. For those familiar with the region, this seems inherently 
intuitive considering often-inconsistent reporting by countries, as well as significant levels of 
political corruption - especially tied to narcotics policing. These numbers are thus viewed as an 
approximation - as well as with a healthy dose of Disraelian skepticism. 
 The third assumption of this research pertains to the assumed role of ethnic identity and 
identity perceptions. As will be discussed in Chapter IV, prior to field research it was assumed 
that perceived ethnic identity would play a key role in influencing state responses to narcotics 
trafficking - as it does in the United States and many other countries. Interviews largely disputed 
this notion. Still, ethnic identity continues to play a critical role in the political geography of the 
Republic. This assumption will be explored in Chapters II, III, and V. 
 Finally, this research assumes that trafficking is fundamentally a spatial process in that it 
both shapes and is shaped by space. This assumption extends to responses to trafficking as well. 
More importantly, this research assumes that these spatial processes play a larger role in shaping 
the Kyrgyz Republic as a political-geographic space. This assumption will also be explored 
further in Chapters II, III, and V.  
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Terminology and Definitions 
Before delving into relevant literature on the topic at-hand, it is imperative to clarify the 
nomenclature which will be employed within this thesis. This includes various terminology and 
acronyms utilized throughout the body of this work. The former is detailed in narrative form 
below, whereas the latter are attached as an appendix (See Appendix A).  
 Foremost, under the purview of this thesis ‘drugs,’ and ‘narcotics,’ are used to denote 
“narcotic drugs,” as defined by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Per 
the UNODC: 
“In the context of international drug control, “narcotic drug” means any of the 
substances, natural or synthetic, in Schedules I and II of the Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and that Convention as amended by the 1972 
Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961.”4 
In this case, narcotics denote both plant-based and synthetic drugs, including opium and opiates, 
coca and cocaine, amphetamines, hallucinogens, cannabinoids, and a variety of other stimulants 
and depressants subject to international control regimes.  
This thesis details the state and societal responses to narcotics trafficking in the Kyrgyz 
Republic with the goal of assessing state capacity. This is primarily in the context of trafficking 
in opiates, i.e. raw and processed opium and heroin. As will be discussed in Chapter V, however, 
the nature of the narcotics trade in Kyrgyzstan is changing. Synthetic narcotics including 
amphetamines, club drugs, hallucinogens, and synthetic cannabinoids were repeatedly cited as 
growing in prominence. Experts interviewed broadly termed these drugs ‘NPS,’ or ‘new 
psychotropic substances.’ This is a catchall term generally applied to synthetic narcotics which 
                                                 
4 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Terminology and Information on Drugs, 2016, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/Terminology_and_Information_on_Drugs-3rd_edition.pdf. 
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also appears in official UN reports. Beyond specific instances - which will be discussed - this 
thesis utilizes the term ‘NPS’ when referring to synthetic narcotics.5 
Throughout this thesis the Kyrgyz Republic will be referenced in several different ways. 
While the official country name is the “Kyrgyz Republic,” it may simply be referred to as 
“Kyrgyzstan.” The latter is considered acceptable and retains widespread usage. Furthermore, the 
simple short form “the Republic,” may also be employed. In Russian-language sources, the 
Republic is sometimes designated “Kirghizia,” however this thesis will refrain from doing so 
unless directly quoting a Russian-language source. Likewise, older source material may use 
alternate spellings regarding the ethnonym and titular nationality for which the country was 
named - often employing ‘Kirghiz’ or ‘Kirgiz’ instead of ‘Kyrgyz.’ This thesis will employ the 
modern spelling and country designation unless an alternate spelling or designation appears in a 
direct quotation. Citizens of the Republic may alternatively be referred to as “Kyrgyz,” or 
“Kyrgyzstani,” depending on the context, however these terms are used interchangeably. When 
discussing “Kyrgyz,” as a titular nationality, it will be clear from context. 
 Considering this research was conducted in a Kyrgyzstan - formerly a republic of the 
Soviet Union - it uses the term ‘post-Soviet,’ extensively. In most contexts, this term is being 
used as a temporal designation to indicate a period following the end of the Soviet Union. There 
are several instances, however, where this term refers to spatial rather than temporal 
characteristics. This will be clear from the context. Furthermore, a portion of the literature 
review in Chapter II will detail the latter usage of the term.  
                                                 
5 Anonymous UN Official, Interview with Anonymous UN Official, interview by Christopher Cowan, In-Person, 
June 29, 2018; Alexander Zelichenko, Interview with Alexander Zelichenko, interview by Christopher Cowan, In-
Person, July 4, 2018. 
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 When referring to the Middle East, this thesis will use the geographic designation of 
Southwest Asia. If the context includes North Africa, then Southwest Asia/North Africa will be 
utilized. Regarding the geographic focus of this thesis - Central Asia - several terms exist within 
literature on the region which may be referenced. These terms include Central Asia, Eurasia, 
Central Eurasia, Inner Asia, and Inner Eurasia. This thesis will utilize the term “Central Asia,” 
when referring to the region – operating under the contemporary definition which indicates the 
five post-Soviet republics which occupy the stretch of territory between China and the Caspian 
Sea and between Russia and Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. While this concept of territory will 
be explored further in Chapter III, generally this definition is informed by the work of acclaimed 
Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid.6 It is likewise informed by drug seizure data sourced from 
the UNODC. The latter definition includes the countries of the region – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – alongside the countries of the South Caucasus – 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – under the broader territorial umbrella of “Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia.”7  
 This thesis makes use of the term “nexus,” when referring to cooperation and/or 
collaboration between criminal organizations and other violent non-state actors such as insurgent 
or terrorist groups. There is considerable debate as to the extent and proper characterization of 
this phenomena. As such, this concept will further be explored in Chapter II. In general, 
                                                 
6 R.M. Alimov, Tsentralnaya Asiya - Obschnost Interesov (Tashkent: Shark, 2005), 
https://www.worldcat.org/title/tsentralnaia-aziia-obshchnost-interesov/oclc/171275037; Ahmed Rashid, The 
Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?, Book, Whole (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994); 
Alexander von Humboldt, Asie centrale: Recherches sur les Chaînes des Montagnes et la Climotologie Comparée., 
3 vols. (Paris: Gide, 1843), https://archive.org/details/asiecentralerec04humbgoog/page/n8. 
7 Rashid, Islam or Nationalism?; UNODC, “Annual Drug Seizures, Kg Equivalents. UNODC World Drug Report 
2018.,” UNODC Statistics and Data, 2018, https://dataunodc.un.org/drugs/seizures. 
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however, use of this term is intended to indicate cooperation and/or collaboration between 
criminal organizations and violent non-state actors.  
Finally, this thesis will employ several acronyms. There is a full table of these acronyms 
included in Appendix A. Several of the more commonly utilized examples are as follows:  
● International Governmental Organizations may be referenced as IGOs 
● The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan may be referenced as IMU 
● Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs may be referenced as MoIA  
● The National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic may be referenced as stat.kg  
● Non-Governmental Organizations may be referenced as NGOs 
● Southwest Asia and North Africa may be referred to as SWANA 
● Synthetic Narcotics may be referenced as NPS, New Psychoactive Substances 
● The United Nations may be referenced as UN 
● The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime may be referenced as UNODC 
Chapter I Summary 
This chapter provided a brief introduction of the research topic and its significance. It 
then discussed the questions which guided this research endeavor, likewise, discussing the 
limitations, delimitations, and assumptions under which this research was conducted. Finally, it 
provided a brief introduction to several unfamiliar terms and concepts central to this work. 
Moving forward, Chapter II provides a literature review examining three concepts: state and state 
capacity, narcotics trafficking, and the insurgent-criminal nexus. Chapter III includes a site 
survey of the region on which research is focused and wherein fieldwork was conducted, 
respectively examining Central Asia broadly and the Kyrgyz Republic specifically. Chapter IV 
details data collection methodology, rationale, procedure, and treatment. Research findings are 
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discussed at length in Chapter V. Finally, Chapter VI provides a conclusion of this thesis and 
suggests areas for further inquiry.  
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Chapter II: Drugs, Insurgents, and States 
 The following literature review seeks to clarify three main concepts as they relate to this 
research. Foremost, this literature review will examine relevant literature on the narcotics trade 
in Central Asia. It proceeds to examine literature on the “insurgent-criminal nexus.” Owing to 
the scant literature in geography on each subject, these sections incorporate information from 
across the broader spectrum of social sciences. Finally, it assesses concepts of state and state 
capacity through a review of selected literature from political geography, political science, 
sociology, and economics. In doing so it seeks to provide an operative framework for concepts of 
state and state capacity.   
A Geography of Drug Trafficking 
 This thesis focuses on the geography of opiate trafficking in Central Asia. Within 
Geography, and under the broader purview of social sciences, this remains a niche topic. While 
considerable academic effort has been devoted to studying cultivation and consumption of 
narcotics, relatively little effort has been spent examining how drugs transit from producer to 
consumer. Also puzzling is the dearth of significant material in Geography despite the inherently 
spatial nature of drug transit. There are numerous plausible explanations for this including safety 
concerns, the covert nature of the activity and those orchestrating it, and the difficulty-of-access 
in regard to both research subjects and sites.8 These considerations in mind, this section will 
                                                 
8 Natalie Koch, “Introduction - Field Methods in ‘Closed Contexts’: Undertaking Research in Authoritarian States 
and Places: Introduction - Field Methods in ‘Closed Contexts,’” Area 45, no. 4 (December 2013): 390–95, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12044; Jonathan S. Taylor, Christopher Jasparro, and Kevin Mattson, “Geographers 
And Drugs: A Survey Of The Literature,” Geographical Review 103, no. 3 (July 2013): 415–30, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1931-0846.2013.00007.x; Johnathan Walker and Jonathan Leib, “Revisiting the Topia 
Road: Walking in the Footsteps of West and Parsons,” Geographical Review 92, no. 4 (2002): 555–81. 
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provide a brief overview of relevant literature on the Central Asian narcotics trade encountered 
in geography and other social science fields during research. 
 “Geographers and Drugs: A Survey of the Literature,” provides the best starting point for 
surveying relevant literature in political geography on the Eurasian drug trade.9 Taylor et al. note 
that while geographers have made limited contributions  - often in a “scattershot,” fashion – 
these contributions have proved valuable to assessing cultivation and production, trafficking and 
distribution, sale and consumption, and the broader geopolitics of illegal drugs.10 In terms of 
cultivation and production geographies, coca, cocaine, and opium remain broadly studied 
whereas cannabis and synthetics are often neglected.11 As such, most literature on trafficking 
focuses on traffic originating in Latin America and terminating in North America or Western 
Europe; literature on trafficking of Afghan-derived opiates remains scant within the discipline.12 
Political and critical geography provide more robust literatures on the illicit narcotics 
trade, particularly examining the relationship between the drug trade, conflict, and institutions. 
Geographers have also provided critical assessments of global counter-narcotics efforts, notably 
the U.S. “War on Drugs,” in terms of power structures and globalization.13 Geographies of 
consumption are largely tied to medical geography and ethnography, but in general consumption 
                                                 
9 Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, “Geographers And Drugs.” 
10 Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, 415. 
11 Kendra McSweeney et al., “Why Do Narcos Invest in Rural Land?,” Journal of Latin American Geography 16, 
no. 2 (2017): 3–29, https://doi.org/10.1353/lag.2017.0019; Zoe Pearson and Nicholas J. Crane, “The Challenge of 
Feminist Political Geography to State-Centrism in Latin American Geography,” Journal of Latin American 
Geography 16, no. 1 (2017): 185–93, https://doi.org/10.1353/lag.2017.0011; Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, 
“Geographers And Drugs,” 416–20. 
12 Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, “Geographers And Drugs,” 420. 
13 Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, 421–23. 
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remains understudied.14 Some areas, including consumption geographies of drug tourism, remain 
completely unexplored.15 Ultimately, geography offers a wellspring of methods, tools, 
approaches, and subdisciplines which can be employed to contribute to broader scholarship on 
illicit narcotics.16 
 Importantly, Taylor et al. grounds this research in three regards. Foremost they provide 
justification for this research by indicating a general lack of literature on the Eurasian drug trade 
within Geography proper.  Granted, this is likely tied to the difficult nature of the research topic. 
According to the authors: 
“Why is the geography of illegal drugs so lacking? The difficulty associated 
with researching illegal drugs is one obvious reason. Factor in the very real 
threat of personal danger when conducting fieldwork on criminal enterprises 
and it is clear that geographic work on illegal drugs is considerably more 
difficult to conduct than geographic work on other agricultural or industrial 
commodities. Beyond difficulty and personal risk, research on illegal drugs 
may well be stigmatized by social, political, and cultural currents, to the extent 
that research in this area is actively discouraged, for example, by Ph.D. 
committees supervising graduate students.”17 
 
To be sure, these are both valid concerns and impediments to research. Challenges in this regard 
will be further explored in Chapters IV and V. Still, such difficulties do not preclude geographic 
inquiry; in fact, they all but necessitate further exploration. They likewise affirm the value of 
                                                 
14 Geoffrey DeVerteuil and Robert D. Wilton, “The Geographies of Intoxicants: From Production and Consumption 
to Regulation, Treatment and Prevention,” Geography Compass 3, no. 1 (2009): 478–94; Eugene McCann and 
Cristina Temenos, “Mobilizing Drug Consumption Rooms: Inter-Place Networks and Harm Reduction Drug 
Policy,” Health & Place 31 (2015): 216–23; Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, “Geographers And Drugs,” 424–25; 
Robert Wilton and Christopher M Moreno, “Critical Geographies of Drugs and Alcohol,” 2012. 
15 Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, “Geographers And Drugs,” 427. 
16 Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, 426–27. 
17 Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, 427. 
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well-planned fieldwork despite the significant challenges and potential concerns. While these 
challenges may eventually impede further research, fieldwork nonetheless lends unique and 
unparalleled observations and context to geographies of narcotics.  
 As indicated in Taylor et al. there are some geographers conducting extensive research on 
the narcotics trade, one of whom is Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy. With specific regard to Central Asian 
opiate trafficking, Opium provides a foundational text - simultaneously one of the most 
comprehensive yet concise summaries of the history, geopolitics, and political economy of the 
global opium trade.18 Relying extensively on fieldwork conducted in Southeast and South Asia, 
Chouvy lends a unique and unmatched expertise to the discourse and traces the deep roots 
contemporary issues surrounding cultivation, trafficking, and consumption of opiates. With 
specific regards to Central and Southwest Asia, Chouvy details a history of trafficking dating to 
the Hellenic era to the present. While opium cultivation was historically confined to Southeast 
and South Asia – excluding Afghanistan – the strategic geopolitics of British and Russian 
imperial expansion in the region during the Great Game gradually forced cultivation and 
trafficking northward.19 The full consequences of this shift became pronounced following the 
Soviet-Afghan War and the broader collapse of the Soviet Union.20  
 While statistics regarding narcotics trafficking in Central Asia are often exaggerated – as 
will be discussed in Chapter V – Chouvy notes the stark increases in narcotics traffic as reported 
by the UN and the region’s republics in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Initially, the UN believed 
                                                 
18 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Opium: Uncovering the Politics of the Poppy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2010). 
19 Chouvy, 80–82. 
20 Chouvy, 82, 86–88. 
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that 65% of opiates cultivated in Afghanistan were passing through the region; this estimate was 
later revised to 15%. Nonetheless, between 1998 and 1999 Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
respectively reported a 250% and 600% increase in illicit narcotics trafficking. The following 
year Kyrgyzstan’s Interior Ministry reported a 1600% increase in overall seizures with an 800% 
increase in heroin specifically.21 While the Taliban had recently come to power in Afghanistan, 
their prohibition on opium cultivation would not be enacted until 2000/2001; this did not 
preclude their adversaries, the Northern Alliance, from continuing to fund their operations 
through drug cultivation and trafficking.22  
With regards to Central Asia, Chouvy’s work illustrates the challenges faced by the 
newly independent states of the region in the 1990s – particularly with political violence and 
struggles to cultivate institutional capacity. Both challenges are intimately linked to the drug 
trade considering the propensity of Tajik and Uzbek militant groups to fund their activities 
through criminal enterprise, as well as the challenges faced by the new states of the region in 
policing their borders.23 Chouvy’s work also discusses the role of terrain, topography, and space 
in the narcotics trade, noting that cultivation and production of organically-based illicit narcotics 
is increasingly concentrated in terrain which provides the requisite balance between remoteness 
                                                 
21 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Les Territoires de l’opium: Conflits et Trafics Du Triangle d’Or et Du Croissant d’Or 
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23 Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P. Swanström, “The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security,” 
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Foster, “Cleansing Violence in the Tajik Civil War: Framing from the Dark Side of Democracy,” National Identities 
17, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 353–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2015.1083967; Jeni Mitchell, “Civilian 
Victimization during the Tajik Civil War: A Typology and Strategic Assessment,” Central Asian Survey 34, no. 3 
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and access.24 Beyond the spatiality of cultivation and production, this discussion further 
intimates the inherently spatial nature of the trafficking process as well as the direct linkages 
between trafficking and state capacity, as will be explored later in this section.25  
  Aside from Opium, Chouvy provides critical insight into typologies of space typically 
associated with geographies of illicit narcotics – namely the idea of “the narco-state.”26 Like 
terrorism, the notion of a narco-state is widely employed albeit ill-defined. In many discussions 
of narcotics trafficking, the term “narco-state” is utilized to imply that a nation-state or de-facto 
state relies on revenues from cultivation, trafficking, or both as its primary source of state 
income, and by extension a primary fiscal source of state capacity. The term emerged in the 
1980s following the ouster of Bolivian dictator Luis Garcia Meza – a coup allegedly financed by 
drug traffickers.27 Since the inception of the term, the label has been applied in a range of 
contexts including Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan.28 Less commonly considered are Guinea 
Bissau,  Tajikistan, and areas of Myanmar. Kyrgyzstan has also been subject to this 
characterization.29  
                                                 
24 Chouvy, Opium, 88. 
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 In his critique of the narco-state, Chouvy argues that the entire notion is simultaneously 
overused and ill defined – rendering it a faulty ideation of space. Furthermore, he argues the term 
should only be utilized in the context of states where the state itself is an active sponsor of the 
narcotics trade and where a majority of overall GDP is derived from this activity. This bimodal 
condition in mind, a true narco-state remains elusive. While many alleged cases have robust 
illicit economies with various degrees of state involvement and/or benefit, in Chouvy’s 
estimation there are currently no states which truly qualify as narco-states. In further challenging 
this trend, Chouvy explores critical discourse on the term.30 This mirrors certain critical and 
feminist geographies which discuss the use of terminology as a manifestation of hegemony and 
scalar power differentials between the global north and the global south in discourses of state 
failure and fragility. The common thread between these discourses is the idea that terms like 
“failed state,” and “narco-state,” are often used to advance ulterior geopolitical motives – often 
tied to securitization and counterterrorism.31  
 Chouvy’s critique of the notion of the “narco-state,” raises several questions. Foremost – 
what is the proper way to characterize the proverbial narco-state considering its prevalence in 
literature on narcotics trafficking?32 In this regard, rather than refigure Chouvy’s critique, it is 
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perhaps best to acknowledge that while a “narco-state,” may not exist there are doubtless states 
which benefit from illicit activity. Unrecognized territorial entities – quasi-states – often fall 
within this category.33 One example is Transnistria - the breakaway region between Moldova and 
Ukraine. Transnistria is perceived as reliant on smuggling – everything from chicken to weapons 
– as a primary economic activity.34 While diplomats have argued that these reports are 
exaggerated, there are other examples in the South Caucasus and Central Asia of codified states 
where such activity is more pronounced – including Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan.35 Beyond 
the purview of the former Soviet Union, a number of countries benefit as havens for activities 
such as illicit finance – including Panama, the Bahamas, and Malta. For their part, state elites 
themselves often engage in or directly benefit from illicit activity.  
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 This intimates the second question raised by Chouvy’s work; namely, how is the “state,” 
defined? Few countries in the international system would consider adopting policies explicitly 
favorable to illicit narcotics trafficking. In many countries, however, individual elites or specific 
institutions often directly engage in illicit activity as a method of sustainment.36  This is as true of 
quasi-states as it is of licit states and takes a variety of forms. Kleptocracy - where elites utilize 
the privilege and financial resources afforded by their status as state elites for personal benefit – 
is one such iteration. While not a new concept, various scholarship has covered this issue in 
detail over the past decade. This notably includes Why Nations Fail and Thieves of State – both 
of which are premised on the notion of kleptocracy as a key hinderance to the development of a 
functional state.37 Central Asia is rife with examples of such behavior –sometimes linked to the 
politics of space, spectacle, and new nationalism.38 In the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
there have long-existed allegations that the same elites pilfering state coffers also benefit from 
the narcotics trade.39 In these comparatively nascent states, Charles Tilly’s characterization of 
state formation as a form of organized crime rings particularly salient.40 That noted, a key flaw of 
Chouvy’s argument is the over-emphasis on the overall institutions of the state to the detriment  
of individual elites and/or singular institutions within the state engaging in illicit activity as a 
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means of personal sustainment. This is as true of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is it is of many other 
nation-states where patronage politics and kinship ties play a dominant role in shaping the 
political apparatus of the state, and where the lines between crime and politics are vague and 
obscured.41  
 Beyond Chouvy’s critical scholarship in Geography on the opium trade, several other 
notable contributions to drug geographies include recent work on geographies of coca production 
and trafficking in Latin America.42 Other salient work includes that of Kyle T. Evered – whose 
historical geography and oral histories of opium-poppy cultivation in rural Anatolia served as an 
inspiration for interview-based fieldwork.43 Considering the linkages between trafficking, 
political violence, and conflict, Philippe Le Billon’s “The Political Ecology of War,” proves 
similarly illuminative in examining how non-state actors utilize extraction and trafficking of 
illicit resources as sources of sustainment.44  
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 Outside of Geography, investigative journalism and other social sciences including 
International Relations, Political Science, and Security Studies provide good scholarship on the 
relationship between trafficking, crime, political violence, and state capacity. This includes 
Gretchen Peters Seeds of Terror – which explores the linkages between the Taliban and other 
anti-government militants in Afghanistan and the opiate trade; Peters work also provides stark 
commentary on the challenges this relationship poses to long-term efforts at cultivating stability, 
state, peace, and prosperity in Afghanistan.45 Sergey Gulonov’s work on trafficking between 
Russia and Kazakhstan goes into considerable depth in detailing the challenges encountered by 
Russian and Kazakh efforts to police narcotics trafficking across a seven thousand kilometer land 
border.46 Finally, several further articles which examine trafficking at national and regional 
scales are insightful in their findings and commentary pertaining to this research.  
Foremost is “The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security,” by Svante 
Cornell and Niklas Swanström.47 Cornell and Swanström are insightful about the challenges 
posed by trafficking at a regional level and to the individual governments of Central Asia, and 
also reiterate the close links between violent non-state actors and the narcotics trade. Based on 
the events of the late 1990s and early 2000s, at the time this analysis was well-founded. In the 
former Soviet periphery, Tajikistan was emerging from a brutal civil war which had generally 
seen an increase in criminality as a result of various factions utilizing criminal enterprise to 
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sustain their activities.48 During the same period, a nascent militant Islamist movement – the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)  – was alleged to be financing its operations across the 
region through involvement in the heroin trade.49 At the current juncture, the article proves 
useful as a framework for examining the issue of narcotics trafficking through a Security Studies 
framework. It likewise serves as a temporal snapshot of trafficking and militancy of the region, 
but does not necessarily reflect current trends seeing as groups such as the IMU and other 
Islamist militants are viewed as playing an increasingly minor role in terrorism and trafficking 
inside Central Asia.50  
The best empirical work encountered during research is that of Mariya Omelicheva and 
Lawrence Markowitz. Funded by a Department of Defense Minerva Grant, their work builds on 
that of Cornell and Swanström – seeking to assess whether the linkages between violent non-
state actors and traffickers are indeed pronounced as alleged. Using aggregate data including 
yearly drug seizures and geolocations of terrorist attacks and individual drug seizures, they 
conclude that total volume of seizures in a given province or oblast is “a significant and positive 
predictor of terrorist violence,” by nonstate actors.51 However, they likewise caution that there 
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are other significant covariates which may influence these patterns. They also note that state 
involvement in illicit trafficking is prevalent, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.52  
Finally, Alexander Kupatadze provides a superb assessment of the drug trafficking 
landscape in Kyrgyzstan circa the early 2010s.53 In “Kyrgyzstan - a virtual narcostate?” he 
challenges the two commonplace assumptions regarding the trafficking landscape in Kyrgyzstan 
based on a series of seventy field interviews he conducted during 2012 while working as a 
consultant to the Kyrgyz government.54 His argument posits that an accurate picture of the 
narcotics trade in Kyrgyzstan remains murky. Despite this, he notes a that the discussion has 
traditionally been dominated by two perspectives, one which alleges considerable state 
involvement in trafficking and the other which emphasizes the role of non-state actors including 
criminal and Islamist groups.55 Kupatadze argues the reality is somewhere between, and there is 
evidence to support both claims.56 As will be discussed in Chapter V, this perspective was 
consistently reaffirmed during interviews. 
This section of literature review serves as the basis for examining the issue of narcotics 
trafficking in Kyrgyzstan under the discipline of Geography. As noted, existing literature within 
the discipline on the Eurasian narcotics trade is minimal; literature from other disciplines proves 
useful, albeit almost equally scant in its coverage of the subject. In terms of relating this 
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literature to the survey-site, there are several key points which should be addressed. Foremost, 
Kyrgyzstan proves a relevant case study for assessing the geography of narcotics trafficking and 
responses, as well as the subsequent influence of these processes on state capacity, due to its 
situation along a major trafficking route. It is a comparatively safe and open field site where the 
issue is pertinent, and methods such as semi-structured interviews with officials remain feasible. 
Furthermore, this section of literature review should make clear that examining the role of 
narcotics trafficking – and broader illicit activities at that – is a worthwhile endeavor within 
Geography given how these processes shape and are shaped by space and state, fall under a 
major research lacunae, and may prove useful to regionally-focused policy development efforts. 
Finally, while the state doubtless plays a major role in trafficking in Eurasia, key discourses in 
existing literature necessitate a brief exploration of the role of non-state actors in trafficking 
processes. 
Insurgents, Criminals, and Terrorists 
 Within broader discourses of involvement of non-state actors in narcotics trafficking, 
there are several key themes which are relevant to examine in the context of this research. 
Foremost is the role of “lootable resources,” in the onset and sustainment of violent armed 
conflict. Key literature on civil war onset often ties the presence of these resources to conflict 
onset and sustainment – particularly as factions struggle to control and profit from these 
resources. While gemstones and hydrocarbon deposits are typically assessed in this regard, areas 
under narcotics cultivation and/or major trafficking routes have likewise proved an important 
consideration for social scientists studying the relationship between resources and conflict 
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onset.57 In the context of this thesis, there are several important takeaways from this literature, 
including competition between non-state actors over the “resource,” of areas under cultivation 
and trafficking routes, as well as the link between these “lootable resources,” issues with state 
capacity, and concerns over conflict onset. Compared with neighboring states such as Tajikistan 
and Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan experiences few issues with regard to violent competition over 
narcotics resources. Nonetheless, narcotics trafficking plays a major role in government 
corruption and undermines the legitimacy of a state which has historically struggled with 
legitimacy and capacity since independence. Furthermore, in the case of Kyrgyzstan violent non-
state actors derive a key source of rents from trafficking and other illicit activities - often to a 
degree that allows them to engage in official politics.58 To paraphrase Clausewitz’s dictum, in 
Kyrgyzstan crime is merely “politics by other means.”59 
 To that effect, it is also necessary to examine the various manners by which involvement 
by violent non-state actors in the narcotics trade is characterized. Scholarship originating from 
Military and Security Studies is useful in this regard. A key example of this is the idea of the 
“insurgent-criminal nexus.”60 Employed across a range of contexts – albeit often with deference 
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to Islamist militants – the nexus typology essentially argues that violent non-state actors such as 
insurgent or terrorist groups will cooperate with organized criminal elements in order to obtain 
funding and/or achieve tactical and strategic goals. In one sense, this characterization is intuitive 
and has several examples across a range of contexts associated with narcotics trafficking – 
including the Peruvian Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso; SL), the M19 Movement, and the 
Taliban (excluding 1999 and 2000), among others.61 With this in mind, taken to its logical 
extreme this characterization can become facile if not vapid – utilized for the purposes of fear 
mongering and propaganda within dialogues of security and securitization. Therefore, it is 
critical to view the concept of a “nexus,” with specific context, history, space, and place in mind 
to avoid falling into this trap. 
 A more intuitive iteration of this concept is advanced by Brad Nicholson and Arnie 
Hammari, who argue that violent non-state actors and organized criminal groups exist along a 
spectrum – alternatively a “continuum” - and move as needed between political and criminal 
activities in terms of necessity, expediency, and sustainment.62 In supporting their case, the 
authors cite African al Qaeda franchises such as al Shabaab in Somalia and al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb as examples of groups who routinely shift their activities between crime such 
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as smuggling and kidnapping, insurgency, and terrorism.63 This characterization of such activity 
is well represented within a number of other examples globally encompassing everything from 
narcotics and antiquities trafficking to hostage taking and cigarette and oil smuggling.64 The 
concept of a spectrum is particularly applicable to Kyrgyzstan, where in addition to occasional 
violence, criminal organizations often engage in a wide range of licit and illicit activities, from 
politics and legitimate business ventures to trafficking in narcotics and other goods.65  
 While these conceptualizations of linkages between crime and terrorism prove useful in 
terms of analyzing existing discourses on the relationship between crime, political violence, and 
state capacity, Kyrgyzstan presents a difficult case study considering comparatively minimal 
political violence in relation to many traditional cases. It is thus more expedient to adapt the 
nexus and spectrum models to the Republic in terms of crime and politics. On one hand, 
individuals affiliated with the state can be directly observed cooperating with or facilitating 
criminal activity. On the other, rather than a nexus such state elites and criminals can be thought 
of as engaging in a spectrum of licit and illicit activities to further their own objectives – 
financial or political. This includes corruption and kleptocracy, but also extends to narcotics 
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trafficking. During their tenure in power, the Bakiev family proved a notable example of this – 
shuttering the State Drug Control Agency (SDCA) due to their alleged ties to trafficking run by 
members of the vory-v-zakone (literally “thieves in law”). Alternatively, Bayman Erkinbaev – 
described as the first drug kingpin of Kyrgyzstan – began his criminal career as a street thug and 
gradually came to be one of the most powerful criminals in the country in addition to becoming a 
popular political figure in the south. This was in-part facilitated by Kyrgyz politicians seeking to 
balance the power and influence of organized crime affiliated with ethnic Uzbeks in the south.66 
As Kupatadze alleges, this fits within a broader pattern of state-crime collusion in many 
countries of the former Soviet Union.67 
 Granted, this issue is not confined to the Kyrgyz Republic. All neighboring co-
regionalists experience similar issues under different circumstances – whether direct state 
criminality in Tajikistan or widespread and deep-seated corruption that predominates the 
governments and political apparatuses of the region. This will be explored to a greater degree in 
Chapter V – namely in regard to how such criminality impacts state capacity. Before proceeding, 
however, it is necessary to examine concepts of state capacity and how they apply to Kyrgyzstan. 
Defining the State 
 Defining the state is as important to this thesis as defining state capacity. In many ways 
the former precludes the latter. As such, this section of literature review will briefly detail several 
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conceptions of state and stateness deemed relevant to this research. These include discussions of 
state and nation, as well as discussions of territory, typologies of state failure, and de-facto states.  
 In any discussion of stateness, it is critical to highlight the difference between nation, 
state, and nation state. Benedict Anderson provides arguably the best and most widely-cited 
definition of nation – “an imagined community which is both limited and sovereign.”68 As will 
be discussed in the next section, states are typically defined in terms of their capacity. 
Traditionally, states are envisioned in Weberian terms: a set of political and bureaucratic 
institutions which governs a sovereign territorial entity through a legitimate monopoly on 
coercion by force.69 States are likewise often conceived as entities which provide services and 
maintain rule-of-law within the territory they control.70 In International Relations, a state 
typically denotes a Westphalian entity which holds a degree of internal and external sovereignty 
over a defined territory with a permanent population. Finally, the nation-state project seeks to 
align the boundaries of the state and the nation.71  
 Within Political Geography, state theory has a contentious history owing to its roots in 
social Darwinism and its role in the rise of Nazism. After the Second World War, the 
subdiscipline experienced a lull in regard to state theory. The end of the Cold War reinvigorated 
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the discussion, however.72  New, critical discussions of state and territory were strongly 
influenced by preceding developments in Marxist and Feminist Geographies, and came to 
encompass a number of issues tied to territory ranging from globalization to the redrawing of 
boundaries and emergence of new forms of state and territory.73 There are several key threads to 
this literature, one of which challenged the continued relevance of the state as an entity. In brief, 
the end of the Cold War resulted in significant speculation that the processes of globalization 
would gradually reduce the importance of the nation-state as the primary actor in geopolitics and 
international relations.74 Other scholarship in critical geography has challenged these 
globalization and deterritorialization narratives, in essence arguing that the frenzied discussions 
of globalization and deterritorialization which occurred following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union – particularly within news-media outlets – displayed little cognizance of the reality of the 
nature of both globalization and the Westphalian system.75 Ongoing discussions in the 
subdiscipline have refuted the notion of the “death,” of the state – instead claiming the value of 
territory as a resource – with some discussions going as far to argue for the incorporation of 
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vertical volume into conceptualizations of territory.76 Taylor specifically conceptualizes the state 
as a territorial container – to be used for war-making and defense, economic development, 
nationalism, social welfare, and political activities.77 
 Failed state literature also provides useful paradigms for examining state and territory. 
This includes work by Jean-Germain Gros, who seeks a more nuanced typology of failed states, 
as well as Pal Kolstø, who examines how quasi-states exist in a state of limbo between statehood 
and lack thereof. Gros’ conceptualization of failed states is imagined around five typologies of 
failed states: the anarchic, the mirage, the anemic, the captured, and the in-vitro.78 By contrast, 
Kolstø focusses on quasi-states – state projects which exist in some form as territorial entities but 
have otherwise failed to receive international recognition. Conditions in quasi-states often mirror 
those of the various typologies of failed state discussed by Gros, with several notable 
exceptions.79 Why Nations Fail also provides a foundational work in state-failure literature, 
arguing that historical precedents play a key role in shaping the future of a state; likewise, a 
state’s economic and political institutions are symbiotically linked and one cannot succeed 
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without the success of another – with success defined as inclusive institutions.80 The final key 
thread to examine within literature on state failure is critical scholarship – which challenges the 
underlying assumptions and narratives surrounding state failure through Marxist and feminist 
discourses. Overarching themes within this literature involve critiques of the use of body and 
disease narratives for describing state failure, the role and responsibility of outside entities for 
state failure, and the weaponization of the term as a tool to serve specific geopolitical interests.81 
This critical discourse provides an important contrast to scholarship on state failure which 
focuses on policies rather than structures.  
 How then is the state defined in the context of the Kyrgyz Republic? This research adopts 
the approach that a single typology of state in the context of discussing capacity in the Republic 
is simplistic and lacks nuance. Instead, it is more useful to examine Kyrgyzstan as a state which 
embodies a range of characteristics embodied within various typologies of state. This includes 
aspects of licit, Westphalian, nation-state, territorial containers envisioned by scholarship in 
International Relations and Political Geography as well as aspects of illicit, failed, and quasi-
states. In the former regard, Kyrgyzstan possesses international sovereignty, a consistent 
population, and nominal control over its territory. While not ethnically homogenous to the point 
of some post-Soviet states, it nonetheless strives to be titular nation-state entity based on shared 
conceptions of culture, history, and national identity among ethnic Kyrgyz.82 
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Considering the latter, Kyrgyzstan embodies aspect of state failure and quasi-stateness, 
from the involvement of state elites in criminal enterprise to widespread institutional corruption 
and struggles to maintain sovereignty over territory. Granted, this does not mean that the 
Republic is at risk of state failure, but merely that the state and its institutions exhibit some 
characteristics of failed and quasi-states. Understanding these non-binary typologies of state 
embodied by Kyrgyzstan provides the basis for deeper inquiry – namely examining the larger 
issues of narcotics trafficking and state capacity in the Republic. 
Defining State Capacity 
The crux of this thesis is understanding the various inputs to narcotics trafficking and 
subsequent responses in the Kyrgyz Republic. This research is ultimately concerned with the role 
of this transnational process in questions of state capacity in Southwest and Central Asia. As 
such, it is necessary to review existing literature detailing state capacity in order to define what 
“state capacity,” means in the context of political geography. In seeking a broad-based 
understanding of the term, it was deemed relevant to review literature in economics, political 
science, development studies, and other fields. While this is not an exhaustive review of 
literature on state capacity, it nonetheless provides a basis for understanding the term in the 
context of this research.  
Within political geography, there are several competing conceptions of state capacity. A 
key thread within these conceptualizations is that many of them assert that state capacity is a 
construct rather than a given; capacity is not inherent within the state entity, but rather must be 
built and is reliant on territory as a resource through which this process is accomplished. It is 
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likewise conceived of as performative in nature – ultimately designed to reproduce the power of 
the state at various scales.83 While such conceptions of capacity are rooted in critical theory, 
critical theorists often fail to consider the key role that culture plays in reconstructing the state.84 
This is particularly true of nationalism and citizenship, as well as identity more broadly.  
Sallie Marston argues these are typically conceived as subordinate to the state itself; they are 
fundamental to the production of states and stateness.85  In assessing these concepts, Marston 
cites Joe Painter, whose conception of states combines the Weberian monopoly and the 
institutionalization of “spatialized social practices.”86 Painter furthermore argues that the 
formation of a state is inherently cultural.87 These processes include the recognition that state 
processes are symbolic, material, and organizational, that the “production of meaning is critical 
to the progress of state development,” and that state activities are performed by agents of the 
state including government functionaries and everyday citizens.88 
Alex Jeffrey’s work on the Brčko district of Bosnia-Herzegovina provides a prescient 
example of efforts to cultivate capacity manifesting in a post-conflict environment. Brčko sits in 
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Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, bounded by Croatia, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Republika Srpska. As a result of international arbitration and the Dayton Peace Accords, it was 
established as a “neutral and multi-ethnic district,” of Bosnia-Herzegovina following inter-ethnic 
conflict in the 1990s.89 The key challenge in the district following the peace deal was cultivating 
capacity – specifically creating a “coherent social container,” in the aftermath of the urbicide and 
ethnic cleansing which occurred during the war.90 In short, district authorities sought to cultivate 
cultural capacity in order to entice citizens to think in terms of the district rather than their ethnic 
identity.91 These efforts manifest spatially through dual-language street signs and home numbers, 
renaming of streets to embody a shared Yugoslav identity and past, and even the creation of a 
holiday celebrating the district. These efforts to cultivate capacity are both performative and 
banal.92 While these efforts were met with backlash - graffiti and vandalism - Brčko District is 
viewed by Alex Jeffrey as a model for generating capacity at a local scale.93 Beyond demonstrating 
the inherently cultural aspect of state capacity, Jeffrey intimates two further notions regarding the 
political-geographic basis for capacity: the idea of the territorial container and the idea of 
performative capacity. While the former concept has been discussed in the previous section, the 
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latter adds a dimension to discussions of capacity which is often overlooked in other literatures but 
is critical to conceptualizing capacity. 
The container envisioned by Taylor as well as aspects of performativity envisioned by 
Painter and Jeffrey are innately tied to the territory of the Kyrgyzstan. In this sense territory serves 
as an inherent base for nationalism. While the south may be geographically and administratively 
disconnected from the north, this nationalist sentiment permeates both regions down to a local 
scale. This manifests in the banal and the deliberate – from statues of Manas to language laws and 
other policies that actively discriminate against minority populations.94 This ethno-nationalism 
likewise served as a driving force behind intercommunal violence in 1990 and 2010. 
Beyond performing nationalism, the fundamental question when discussing performativity 
in the context of state capacity is, can the state act like a state?  This raises further lines of 
questioning, including what it means to act like a state, which capacities are associated with 
stateness and how are they measured, and what actions are taken by states which can be construed 
as performative in nature. The concept of performativity has roots in feminist gender theory, 
namely the work of Judith Butler.95 In political geography, it offers an equally valuable framework 
– in this case for exploring the behavior and capacity of states in the spaces which they control or 
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seek to control.96 As has been demonstrated, control of spaces and landscapes play a key role in 
the performative capacity of the state. This is especially true in the context of the urban, as 
illustrated by Jeffrey.97 Post-socialist urbanism in the former Soviet Union also serves as an 
excellent case study in the performative capacity of states – particularly state efforts to cultivate 
new nationalisms from the banal.98 The latter concept will be further explored in Chapter III. 
Critical geographers and scholars of political violence likewise offer valuable input in discussing 
how states engage in performative capacity through discussions of security, or how non-state 
actors perform capacity through provision of services and governance of captured or controlled 
territory.99  
Beyond discussions of capacity outright, further work by political geographers offers 
useful frameworks for assessing capacity, particularly that John Agnew’s work on sovereignty 
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regimes.100 This is especially considering that the notion of sovereignty – internal and external – 
is inherent in commonplace conceptions of capacity. Agnew founds his argument by critiquing 
dichotomous conceptualizations of state power as despotic and infrastructural power – the former 
of which is the power of the state over society and the latter of which is the power of the state to 
penetrate, coordinate, and coopt civil society through the infrastructure of power.101 Agnew’s 
alternative envisioning of power argues: 
“What is needed, therefore, is a typology of the main ways in which sovereignty 
is currently exercised to take account of: (1) its social construction; (2) its 
association with hierarchical subordination; and (3) its deployment in territorial 
and non-territorial forms. The two basic dimensions to the typology are defined 
by the relative strength of the central state authority (state despotic power) on one 
axis and its relative consolidation in the state territoriality (state infrastructural 
power) on the other.”102 
Building on this notion, Agnew envisions four historically rooted regime types which 
have come to dominate conceptions of capacity and sovereignty in the modern era. The first is 
the “classic,” Westphalian sovereignty regime, under which infrastructural and despotic power 
are territorially bounded. This is followed by the “imperialist,” sovereignty regime, under which 
infrastructural power is weak and territoriality and despotic power are in question. The 
“integrative,” regime is best described as a federal-style or EU-style sovereignty regime with 
infrastructural and despotic power distributed at various levels. Finally, the “globalist,” regime is 
embodied by a regime which relies on military capacity, international institutions, and hegemony 
to shape the global order through coercion or consensus, i.e. a superpower or hyperpower state 
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such as the United States.103 Agnew’s strongest example of these regimes is demonstrated 
through extensive review of currency practices in China, the United States, the European Union, 
and Latin America.104 He concludes by arguing that sovereignty does not exist solely under the 
territorially bounded Westphalian system, and that there is “political authority beyond the 
sovereign construction of territorial space.”105 The final line of Agnew’s discussion on 
sovereignty is key in that it links the concepts of sovereignty and capacity; just as there is no 
singular sovereignty regime, there is no singular capacity regime. Furthermore, considering that 
a lion’s share of capacity literature is grounded on the notion of sovereignty – especially in the 
Westphalian context – it can be argued that some manner of sovereignty is a precursor for 
capacity, and that a firm understanding of sovereignty regimes is likewise critical to assessing 
capacity.106 
Under Agnew’s framework of sovereignty and capacity, the Kyrgyz Republic falls under 
the category of a classic sovereignty regime; power and infrastructural capacity are territorially 
bounded. The south, particularly Batken Oblast, is the site of challenges to sovereignty in the 
form of territorial enclaves and exclaves of neighboring states, as well as a general sentiment of 
disconnectedness from the political and economic power in the north. Threats to Kyrgyzstan’s 
sovereignty are far more likely to come from within than from neighbors. In this sense, 
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Kyrgyzstan’s capacity suffers from internal challenges as a result of physical geography and 
territorial organization – mountains and exclaves, respectively – rather than direct state-state 
contest. Arguably a more important takeaway from Agnew’s assessment of capacity through 
sovereignty regimes is that inherent within Westphalian concepts of sovereignty is the notion of 
control of territory. Thus, Kyrgyzstan’s internal territorial sovereignty should be considered as a 
key metric when assessing the capacity of the state.  
One final work in political geography serves as a bridge between political-geographic 
conceptions of state capacity and sociological, economic, and political science-oriented 
conceptions of capacity. Counter to many “neo-Weberian scholars,” Jim Glassman argues that 
capacity of the state is defined as the ability and willingness of state elites to facilitate 
international flows of capital.107 Glassman’s argument is fundamentally tied to the notion of 
deterritorialization and globalization, and relies on the notion that capital and state-elites are no-
longer confined or explicitly tied to the distinct territorial units of states.  
Glassman’s argument of regressive capacity seems well-suited for Kyrgyzstan. Following 
independence, Kyrgyzstan came to be characterized as the “Switzerland of the East.”108 An 
analogy which swapped the Alps for the Tian Shan, it mirrored the “island of democracy,” 
rhetoric vaunted in Western circles and by the Kyrgyz government itself. Kyrgyzstan grew to 
resemble Switzerland in more ways than one, however, becoming a destination for international 
money laundering. Kyrgyzstan’s own Asia Universal Bank was a chief offender for handling 
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both foreign dirty money as well as cash pilfered from foreign aid and state coffers.109 By 
Glassman’s definition of capacity, what appears to many as a kleptocratic backwater is in fact a 
highly capable state; elites actively pursued policies which facilitated international capital flows 
to and from the Republic. The same elites tended to benefit directly from such policies if they 
weren’t the ones laundering the money themselves – as was the case with the Bakiev 
administration.110  
Still, Glassman’s definition of capacity proves limited in two regards despite offering a 
useful framework for considering capacity. Foremost, the ability to facilitate capital flows in 
some regards relies upon capacity as a precondition - some degree of internal and external 
sovereignty as well as social or political institutions. When applying Glassman’s definition, it 
furthermore becomes clear that the reality of the situation is considerably more nuanced. For 
example, by Glassman’s definition both Nigeria and Transnistria could be argued as having 
“capacity.” Yet one contains an international financial hub – Lagos – whereas the other is a 
quasi-state supported by Russia and known for chicken smuggling.111 Furthermore, in the context 
of Central Asia, Glassman’s conceptualization of capacity seems counterintuitive. While states 
do have “capacity,” to facilitate international flows of capital, these are often one-way flows 
from abroad into the pockets of kleptocratic elites. Phrased differently, “capacity,” in Central 
Asia does not exist to benefit of global hyper-capitalism, but rather it exists to benefit local elites 
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and their patronage networks. With regards to the latter point, Glassman’s measures of capacity 
often directly undermine traditional measures of capacity.  
Considering, the work in political geography on capacity, this thesis thus proposes an 
ideation of capacity as a spectrum with regressive and progressive aspects. A state performing 
the duties of a state – providing utilities or services, maintaining rule-of-law and territorial 
sovereignty, defending territory – could thus be considered progressive aspects of capacity. 
Comparatively, state facilitation of capital flows and associated corruption can be viewed as 
regressive considering they diminish the public legitimacy and functional competency of a state. 
As capacity is explored further through other social science disciplines, this progressive-
regressive scale will serve as the framework for assessing further aspects of capacity.  
Beyond the scope of political geography, Charles Tilly provides foundational framework 
for conceptualizing capacity, oft-cited by economists and other social scientists.112 Theorizing 
governments as racketeers, he argues that the state-system is a byproduct of elites warring to 
accumulate capital.113 Tilly’s concept of states argues that proto-modern European states sought 
capacity prior to their codification as modern territorial entities. Like Agnew, Tilly uses a four-
part definition to capacity. Tilly’s basis for capacity is conceived as follows: 
“Under the general heading of organized violence, the agents of states 
characteristically carry on four different activities: 
1. Warmaking: eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in 
which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force 
2. Statemaking: eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories 
3. Protection: eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients 
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4. Extraction: acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities: 
warmaking, statemaking, and protection.”114  
Tilly continues, noting that extraction – which modern theorists of capacity often view in terms 
of taxes – relies on a state’s monopoly on coercive force. Furthermore, each aspect of capacity is 
innately tied to the development of state institutions from militaries, police, and intelligence 
services to administrative and tax bureaucracies. Considering the critical nature of the 
scholarship and the emphasis on use-of-force, it is little wonder Tilly utilizes organized crime as 
an analogue for state-building. Both are built on coercive extraction of capital and use of 
violence.115 Likewise, it is unsurprising that this theory of state building and state capacity is 
considered in terms of predation.116 Like Agnew, though, Tilly notes that his framework for 
assessing the development of states – and by extension their capacity – is not a universal model 
considering its reliance on Europe as a primary case study.117  
 Building on Glassman’s model of regressive capacity, Tilly’s model can be construed as 
staunchly regressive considering it models capacity as designed to extract rents for the purpose 
of perpetuating conflict and benefiting select clients. Within Kyrgyzstan, political patronage 
networks bear strong resemblance to the second, third, and fourth aspects of Tilly’s model. 
While only the Bakiev regime was directly implicated in assassinating political opponents, each 
post-independence regime in Kyrgyzstan has embodied these aspects of capacity in some form or 
another, whether through wide-ranging corruption scandals or harassment and targeting of 
                                                 
114 Tilly, 15. 
115 Tilly, “Warmaking and Statemaking.” 
116 Cameron G. Thies, “Conflict, Geography, and Natural Resources: The Political Economy of State Predation in 
Africa,” Polity 41, no. 4 (October 2009): 465–88, https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2008.32. 
117 Tilly, “Warmaking and Statemaking.” 
43 
 
political opponents and civil society organizations.118 Granted, this model is more germane in 
neighboring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which both share histories of severe repression and 
extensive state criminality.  In this regard, Tilly’s model of state formation as organized crime 
addresses several of the key flaws of Glassman’s model.  
Nonetheless, there are critical shortcomings to Tilly’s framework. Foremost, it fails to 
emphasize territory as a critical resource for states beyond strategic considerations. Territory is a 
critical component of state formation and state capacity; it is ultimately a precursor for all 
aspects of Tilly’s model – particularly rent extraction. The institutions established to extract rents 
are inherently reliant on the territory possessed by the state as a basis for extracting rent in the 
form of taxes or resources. While this is hinted in Tilly’s emphasis on internal and external 
sovereignty as critical components of state efforts to generate capacity, it lacks the emphasis of a 
political geographer. The other key critique of Tilly’s model of regressive capacity is that it fails 
to acknowledge the performative aspects of state-building – primarily those tied to nationalism. 
While the concept of nation may have lacked resonance in the early period of Tilly’s survey, by 
the early 19th century it was destined to play a determinative role in the modern territorial 
organization of Europe. Likewise, nationalism served as a guiding doctrine in the establishment 
of modern European empires, themselves designed to improve the rent extraction and 
geostrategic capacities of the metropole.  
Tilly and Glassman’s models of capacity imply a broader disconnect between political-
geographic models of capacity and those found in other social sciences, which tend to focus on 
the technical aspects of state capacity over the territorial and performative. In fact, in Kyrgyzstan 
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and the surrounding Republics, territory and performance have played a critical role in 
cultivating the capacity of the post-Soviet state. Territory serves as a resource by and through 
which the states of the region can extract the rent required to cultivate capacity. It likewise serves 
as stage for capacity to be performed – often through gilded urban development, banal 
monuments, and efforts within currency and state-symbols to engender the notion of a nation-
state tied to specific aspects of place and territory.119  
Despite such shortcomings, Tilly and Glassman present a compelling argument for 
considering state-capacity in terms of a progressive-regressive spectrum closely tied to rent 
extraction and movement of capital. Tilly’s broader work has likewise played a played a key 
theories of capacity within economics and political science, which often conceive of capacity in 
terms of the ability to levy taxes, enforce contracts and property rights, and regulate 
commerce.120 While lacking with regard to a broader concept of capacity, the fiscal view of 
capacity is worth exploring given it is often regarded a fundamental aspect of state capacity and 
the quality of “stateness.”  
Besley and Persson, for example, argue that state capacity is defined by the ability of the 
state to enforce contracts - “legal capacity,” - as well as the ability of the state to levy taxes and 
spend them on public goods - termed “fiscal capacity.”121 Under this framework, Besley and 
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Persson argue that the ability to cultivate legal and fiscal capacity - i.e. the ability to enforce 
contracts and levy taxes for public goods - are critical to broader development of state capacity 
and the broader success nation-state as a whole.122 In a subsequent article, Besley and Persson 
present the idea of capacity simply as the ability of a state to “implement a range of policies,” 
based on the constraints of a state’s fiscal and legal capacity.123 In tying implementational ability 
and economic development to fiscal and legal capacity, the authors likewise critique work in 
economics which fails to link these aspects of capacity – particularly in cases of weak or fragile 
states.124 In their estimation, a lack of legal capacity contributes to both lackluster economic 
growth and the risk of civil conflict onset. Tangentially, a lack of fiscal capacity results in low 
incomes.125 While the work of Besley and Persson seemingly provides important aspects for the 
overall consideration of capacity, like Tilly and Glassman it remains divorced from the 
importance of territory and nationalism. The authors thus acknowledge the simplicity of their 
model, further noting that it fails to account for the importance of political and social institutions 
as they pertain to capacity.126 
Whereas Besley and Persson intimate the relevance of history and institutions as they 
pertain to capacity, Acemoglu and Robinson provide an entire book on the subject in Why 
Nations Fail. Over the course of the book, the authors rely on a number of historical and 
contemporary case studies in order to demonstrate the causes of state failure. In relying on these 
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cases, they demonstrate several things. Foremost, state capacity or lack thereof is inexorably 
linked to the nature of the economic and political institutions which govern a given country. 
Acemoglu and Robinson assert that institutions which are politically and economically inclusive 
trend toward higher levels of success and capacity. In contrast, institutions which are repressive, 
and extractive coincide with low levels of capacity and/or state failure. In relating this work to 
Besley and Persson, it can be argued that inclusive institutions as defined by Acemoglu and 
Robinson typically involve legal capacity wherein contracts can be enforced by governments. 
Higher levels of capacity also involve governments which largely pursue public interest when it 
comes to policy - an extension of fiscal capacity in the sense that tax revenues are utilized to 
benefit the largest number of citizens.127  
Acemoglu and Robinson likewise incorporate specific concepts from political geography 
when crafting their conception of capacity. Primarily is the notion of political centralization. 
Examining the concept in the context of Somalia, they argue that the abject lack of political 
centralization has resulted in a state devoid of capacity.128 This argument is couched in the notion 
that the lack of political centralization was fundamentally tied to the unwillingness of some elites 
to subject themselves to the control of others; rather than developing a centralized political core 
and a political periphery governed by the core, Somalia remained entirely periphery.129  The 
result of a lack of political centralization is weak state capacity - particularly in the fiscal and 
legal sense. Despite this passing reference to political geography, however, Acemoglu and 
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Robinson likewise downplay the role of territory and nationalism in their conceptualization of 
capacity.  
In reviewing Besley and Persson and Acemoglu and Robinson, as conceived by 
economists, state capacity is defined as the ability of the state to exact taxation for public benefit 
and enforce contracts and/or property rights, and pursue policy goals. These measures raise 
questions about the capacity of the Kyrgyz state. Key considerations in this regard include the 
difficulties of centralization and rent extraction in the form of taxes, as well as exclusive 
economic and political institutions enveloped in the politics of kinship and patronage.130 Tilly’s 
characterization of state making as organized crime likewise rings salient, given evidence of 
close links between state-elites and organized crime in the Republic.131 These kinship and 
patronage networks and a strong state-crime nexus all impede spending in the good of the 
general populace in favor of preferential corruption. Finally, under the economic model of 
capacity Kyrgyzstan’s ongoing political challenges and struggles are directly tied to its struggles 
to cultivate capacity – which are in-turn a facet of structural issues with its economic and 
political institutions as well as the legacies of Soviet control. 
Many frameworks of state capacity originating in Political Science also adopt fiscal and 
legal notions of capacity. There is some work, however, that builds upon or challenges this 
paradigm. Cullen S. Hendrix notes lacunae of a specific definition of capacity beyond the notions 
of Weberian monopoly, policy enactment, provision of services, and tax collection, for 
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example.132 With regards to conflict onset, he asserts that measures of capacity which emphasize 
regime type place certain regimes at higher risk of civil conflict, but prove poor predictors of 
conflict outcome.133 This in mind, Hendrix proposes an alternative set of measures which 
emphasize three meta-aspects of capacity: rational legality, rentier-autocraticness, and neo-
patrimonality.134 Rational legality assumes that a democratic state possesses more effective and 
efficient bureaucratic institutions whereas autocracies exhibit opposite characteristics.135 Rentier-
autocraticness is an index spanning high-rent autocracies on one end to resource-poor 
democracies on the other.136 Neo-patrimoniality is defined by Hendrix as an index bounded by 
“monarchies where the monarch is the direct beneficiary of the country’s natural resource wealth 
(Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait).”137 On the opposite end of this spectrum are resource-poor 
democracies.138 The conclusion that these qualities constitute measures of state capacity is 
supported by Hendrix’s analysis of civil-conflict onset in 101 countries from 1984-1989.  
This analysis concludes that the countries on the bottom end of these spectrums are typically 
more vulnerable to civil conflict onset, whereas countries at the top are less vulnerable. More 
                                                 
132 Cullen S Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil 
Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (May 2010): 273–85, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310361838. 
133 Hendrix, 276. 
134 Hendrix, 280. 
135 Hendrix, 282. 
136 Hendrix, 282. 
137 Hendrix, 282. 
138 Hendrix, 282. 
49 
 
importantly, Hendrix concludes that fiscal capacity is significantly correlated with all three 
considerations.139  
In a separate analysis, Hendrix incorporates terrain modeling into his efforts to discern 
capacity, which he notes is a critical consideration for assessing the fiscal and bureaucratic 
capacity of states.140 Hendrix’s assessment views rough terrain – such as mountains – as a key 
impediment to the bureaucratic and fiscal capacities of states in the sense that ensures that a.) tax 
collection is more difficult and b.) tax collection is costlier. As a result, states with territorially-
diminished capacity are viewed as more susceptible to civil conflict onset.141  This analysis is 
also uniquely valuable among other literature in the sense that it incorporates an aspect of 
territory – terrain – into concepts of capacity. Still, both of Hendrix’s assessments fail to address 
nationalism and aspects of performativity as they pertain to capacity.  
  Nonetheless, Hendrix’s work holds direct relevance to the Kyrgyz Republic in terms of 
assessing capacity. Kyrgyzstan is a largely resource-poor democracy which has experienced 
longstanding challenges with corruption and bureaucratic effectiveness. In terms of terrain, 90% 
of the country lies above 1000 meters in elevation, and the massive peaks of the Tian Shan and 
the Pamir bifurcate much of the country. At the same time, there is only an individual tax burden 
of approximately 10% across the country.142 By these measures Kyrgyzstan can be considered 
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susceptible to conflict based on lacking capacity. Actual instances of internal conflict and 
political violence in Kyrgyzstan lend support to this assessment, including inter-ethnic violence 
in the 1990s and 2010s, as well as two successive revolutions and several other prominent 
instances of political violence. 
Aside from Hendrix, Sally N. Cummings and Ole Nørgaard provide a comprehensive 
conception of state capacity in the context of Central Asia.143 Utilizing Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan as case studies for attempts to cultivate capacity in post-Communist states, they 
conceptualize for areas through which capacity can be assessed; these include ideational, 
political, technical, and implementational capacities.144 In their assessment, the political capacity 
of a state is seen as defining effective governance within the context of a given state. This 
includes the ability of the state to draft and implement effective policy - termed “horizontal 
capacity,” - as well as the ability of the state to both secure resources form domestic and 
international society while simultaneously maintaining autonomy during the policy-drafting 
process  - termed “vertical capacity.”145 Technical capacity simply refers to the resources - both 
material and intellectual - which can be brought to bear on behalf of the state. Implementation 
capacity denotes the ability of a state to enact policy decisions.146 Finally, ideational capacity 
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indicates how elites function and generate consensus within the state structure - both within the 
state apparatus and between the state and its citizens.147 
Their work then applies these concepts of capacity to an analysis of a 2002 survey of 125 
mid-level officials in both countries.148 The comparative analysis notes the key similarities 
between both countries, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, strong centralized 
structures and bureaucracies retained from the Soviet era, direct-rule by the executive, and state-
ownership of key economic sectors; each state is likewise controlled by its titular nationality. It 
also highlights critical differences, including size, economic structures, political liberalization, 
and potential sources of rent - including tax bases, natural resource wealth, and foreign aid. 149 In 
utilizing interviews to compare the two countries, Cummings and Nørgaard assume that their 
respondents represent a small subset as opposed to a sample. They likewise assume that 
respondents provided objective responses, and that the respondents position as a mid-level 
official provides them with a unique perspective and insight in understanding the machinery of 
the state.150  
In reviewing interview responses based on Cummings and Nørgaard’s concepts of 
capacity, the authors note key differences between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan pertaining to 
official perspectives on measures of capacity. Kazakhstan has seemingly cultivated greater 
capacity based on its location, resource wealth, and political centralization. Comparatively, 
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Kyrgyzstan’s capacity remains challenged by a lack of resources as well as inter-regional 
rivalries and clan affiliations. Both states face major challenges to capacity as a result of 
corruption and politicization of bureaucratic apparatuses, Kyrgyzstan especially in the case of the 
latter. Finally, Cummings and Nørgaard specifically note the threat posed to capacity in both 
states by organized crime - something potentially exacerbated the embrace of Western models of 
governance, unfettered free markets, and privatization.151 In sum, while both states fare arguably 
better than their neighbors, each struggle with a unique set of issues when it comes to cultivating 
and retaining capacity.  
Of the non-geographic literature reviewed, Cummings and Nørgaard provide an excellent 
and comprehensive ideation of capacity that expands upon otherwise truncated discourse of 
fiscal and legal capacities. Their methodology also proves relevant, as does their focus on 
Central Asia as a study site. Importantly, they address several of the key shortcomings of 
economic models of capacity by addressing aspects of nationalism, performative capacity, and 
territory in their respective discussions of ideational capacity and technical capacity – the latter 
being tied to the material resources available to the state within its respective territory. While it 
relies on data that is comparatively dated – not reflecting political strife in 2005 and 2010 in 
Kyrgyzstan and in 2019 in Kazakhstan – it nonetheless provides a valuable snapshot of the 
longstanding issues with capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic. This includes corruption, issues with 
political centralization, a lack of exploitable rents, and the role of crime as a key detriment to 
state capacity.  
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In seeking to advance from competing conceptions of state capacity, what is clear is that 
what constitutes “capacity,” is infinitely more nuanced than a single disciplinary approach – 
especially in the context of Kyrgyzstan. Perhaps this is the reason “state capacity,” remains an 
ill-defined yet often referenced chimera. Thus, the proper approach to defining state capacity in 
the context of Kyrgyzstan is the same approach employed when defining the state. Namely, 
capacity in the Republic incorporates various elements of literature reviewed into an overall 
amalgam. This includes standard-fare conceptions of capacity rooted in economics, political 
science, and sociology such as the ability to extract rents, collect taxes, and maintain the 
Weberian monopoly. However, it also involves the ability of the state to perform the functions 
associated with a state controlling territory as conceived by Taylor, Painter, and Jeffrey. 
Importantly, capacity cannot exist without territory, and territory serves as a critical resource for 
cultivating capacity. As will be demonstrated in Chapter III, the Republic has struggled with 
various aspects of capacity – particularly the political-geographic dimensions of capacity – since 
initial independence in 1991. These challenges persist to this day. 
Conclusion: Chapter II 
 This chapter provided a brief overview of literature deemed relevant to this thesis during 
research, including work on narcotics trafficking in Eurasia, the linkages between criminals, 
state-elites, and non-state actors, and conceptions of state and state capacity. In reviewing this 
literature, this section introduces concepts relevant to the remainder of this thesis. Importantly, 
this section demonstrates a critical lack of scholarship examining the relationship between drug 
trafficking and state capacity in the context of Central Asia broadly, and the Kyrgyz Republic in 
particular. With this in mind, the next chapter will provide an overview of the geographic region 
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of scope that serves as the focus of this research – with a brief section introducing Central Asia 
followed by a detailed discussion of the Kyrgyz Republic as a place and space.  
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Chapter III: Site Survey 
Beyond reviewing literature, it is critical to provide context of space and place for Central 
Asia at large and the Kyrgyz Republic in particular. This section will provide a brief overview 
Central Asia, including its composition as well as its global significance as a world region. More 
importantly, this section will include extensive discussion of Kyrgyzstan in terms of place and 
space. In doing so, this section aims to provide context for discussing fieldwork and findings. 
Asie Centrale 
As noted in Chapter I, defining “Central Asia,” often proves difficult owing to various 
competing terminologies and definitions further complicated by long histories of trade, conquest, 
empire, and collapse; in Western scholarship the debate over defining the region dates to the 19th 
and early 20th centuries. Some of the earliest attempts to define Central Asia as a distinct 
geographic region were undertaken by early modern geographers. Alexander von Humboldt is 
first credited with using the term in his so-named three-volume Asie Centrale, first published in 
1843. To this day, it has yet to be translated from the original French.152 Other competing 
terminology has included “Inner Asia,” “High Asia,” and even “High Tataria,” the latter a 
reference to the Turkic peoples who played a central role in the region and its conquests from the 
Mongols to the Russians.153 These definitions of the region also reflected imperial conquest – 
Russian Turkestan, “Soviet Central Asia,” and the “Soviet Orient,” have all been used to denote 
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the region as well.154 Other definitions have also focused on the important cultural and historical 
urban centers of the region, including Bukhara and Samarqand in present-day Uzbekistan as well 
as Merv in present-day Turkmenistan.155 
Mackinder’s Pivot 
The birth of political geography in the late 19th and early 20th century coincided with a 
new ideation of Central Asia. Under the framework of geopolitics, Central Asia grew to be 
considered as a critical geostrategic pivot.156 This idea of “Heartland Theory” was originally put 
forth in Sir Halford J. Mackinder in his 1904 article entitled “The Geographical Pivot of 
History.” Concerned with the rise of nascent powers including Russia, Germany, and China, 
Mackinder presented a theory of space and geopolitical organization which subdivided the world 
into three areas – the heartland, the inner crescent, and the outer crescent.157 Both the heartland 
and inner crescent were contained to the Eurasian landmass, which Mackinder termed the “world 
island.” Mackinder’s dictum argues: 
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: 
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: 
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.158 
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Still, in the years between delivering his initial lecture and the initial days of the Cold War, 
Mackinder’s ideation of a “world heartland,” occupying Southwest and Central Asia remained 
vague and undefined.159 
The beginning and end of the Cold War saw the reinvigoration of Mackinder’s dictum. In 
the United States, for example, it played a guiding role in the doctrine of containment - 
influencing the likes of Nicholas Spykman and George F. Kennan. Beyond containing the Soviet 
Union, Mackinder’s theory emerged as a critical aspect of security discourse on resource 
geopolitics. While a wellspring of critical scholarship within Geography emerged on 
Mackinder’s work following the end of the Cold War, in other disciplines and popular mediums 
the term emerged alongside the idea of globalization in vapid discourse and buzzword 
geopolitics – often employing Mackinder’s dictum to advance foreign policy discourse and 
geopolitical agendas.160 This discourse has persisted to this day; the coverage of China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative provides one such example.161  
The key issue with this discourse – beyond a lack of critical engagement of Mackinder - 
is that it diminishes the importance and agency of Central Asia as a region in its own right. 
While the region remains strategically important to world powers for its situation between major 
world powers and its strategic resource reserves, it likewise possesses its own, unique 
geopolitical history predating the Westphalian system. The states of the region are likewise their 
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own actors, have played a major role in shaping geopolitical events on a regional and global 
scale. Still, the region often remains consigned to Mackinderian discourses.162 
At the Edge of Empire 
 Territorial organization in its modern form in Central Asia occurred in the early years of 
the Soviet Union. Borders were drawn and redrawn several times before the modern territorial 
units of Central Asia emerged (See Appendix B). Stalin’s cynical cartography – particularly in 
the Ferghana Valley – ensured the titular nationalities of the so-named Soviet Socialist Republics 
were distributed across three different countries with little concern for historical and cultural ties 
to place.163 Tajikistan presents a particularly egregious example; the new national capital of 
Dushanbe was fabricated from a market town whilst the important cultural and historical Tajik 
cities of Samarqand and Bukhara were placed in Uzbekistan.164  
The true consequences of Soviet-imperial cartography would present themselves as the 
Union collapsed in the early 1990s. Like so many post-colonial states, borders imposed by 
outsiders would contribute to internal and interstate conflict in the region; these conflicts 
manifested in disputes over political power, land, and resource access, and in the case of 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan would all be accompanied by violence, including ethnic 
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riots, inter-state conflict, and civil war.165 These outbreaks of violence were concentrated in the 
Ferghana Valley, which to this day remains a “tinderbox,” for conflict and disputes over territory 
and resources in the region.166 At the eastern end of this “tinderbox,” lies the Kyrgyz Republic 
(See Appendix B). 
The Kyrgyz Republic as a Place 
 The Kyrgyz Republic is a small, mostly mountainous country situated in eastern Central 
Asia between Kazakhstan, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (See Appendices B and C). A 
former Soviet satellite republic, it gained independence with the collapse of the Union in 1991.167 
It holds the distinction of being the only parliamentary democracy in a neighborhood of 
strongmen.168 With a population of approximately six million, it is the smallest Central Asian 
republic.169 Key economic sectors include agriculture and mineral extraction; 
                                                 
165 Shishkin, Restless Valley; Valery Tishkov, “`Don’t Kill Me, I’m a Kyrgyz!’: An Anthropological Analysis of 
Violence in the Osh Ethnic Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 2 (May 1995): 133–49, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343395032002002. 
166 “Ferghana Valley: A Tinderbox For Violence,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, accessed March 17, 2019, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/Why_Is_The_Ferghana_Valley_A_Tinderbox_For_Violence/2074849.html; Aksana 
Islamibekova and Sophie Roche, “The Glimmer of Hope in Bloody Kyrgyzstan,” Ferghana News, November 8, 
2010, http://enews.fergananews.com//article.php?id=2654; Megoran, “Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Boundary”; Nick 
Megoran, “The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary Dispute, 1999–2000,” 
Political Geography 23, no. 6 (August 2004): 731–64, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2004.03.004; Catherine Putz, 
“Kyrgyz and Tajiks Clash Along Disputed Border,” August 4, 2015, 2; “Residents of Border Villages of Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan in Dispute over Waterpipe,” accessed April 14, 2019, https://akipress.com/news:610965/; “Second 
Tajik Villager Killed In Dispute Over Road Near Kyrgyz Border,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, accessed April 
14, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-villager-killed-in-dispute-over-road-near-kyrgyz-border/29820974.html. 
167 Shishkin, Restless Valley. 
168 John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of Democracy? (Amsterdam, NL: Harwood Academic 
Publishers, 1999). 
169 Central Intelligence Agency, “Central Asia :: Kyrgyzstan — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency,” 
CIA World Factbook, September 26, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/kg.html. 
60 
 
similar to neighboring Tajikistan, a significant portion of GDP is tied to remittances from 
Kyrgyz guest workers in Russia.170  
Historically and culturally, there are strong traditions linked to nomadic lifestyle - an 
important aspect of national identity. Islam is widespread throughout the country; pockets of 
Orthodox Christianity remain - primarily concentrated with populations of ethnic Russians in the 
north.171 Russian and Kyrgyz are the official languages, however approximately 14% of the 
population also speak Uzbek or another language as a byproduct of internal ethnic  
diversity (See Appendices D and E). 
 Politically, the recent history of the Republic is fraught with intrigue. Since 
independence, there have been significant and contentious debates surrounding national identity - 
sometimes resulting in inter-ethnic violence.172 In 2005 and 2010 successive governments were 
ousted because of corruption by mass public demonstrations and protests.173 Following the 
Second Kyrgyz Revolution in 2010, there was a period of interim governance which has been 
followed by two successive elections in 2011 and 2017. The latter was judged by international 
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observers as the most competitive in the country’s history despite charges of widespread vote-
buying and abuse of public resources.174  
As will be discussed, governance and state capacity have been a near-constant challenges 
in Kyrgyzstan since initial independence in 1991.These challenges are resultant from the 
persistence of clan-based kinship and patronage networks by the political elite, privileging of 
select ethnicities by circumstance or by Soviet authorities, and challenging physical geography 
which has resulted in a pronounced north/south divide in the country.175 Alongside rich historical 
and cultural traditions, these politics have played a critical role in shaping the Republic as a 
space.  
A Brief History of Kyrgyzstan 
 Before examining Kyrgyzstan as a space, it is necessary to further examine the 
Kyrgyzstan’s history with a special emphasis on the development of modern Kyrgyz 
nationalism. This provides critical context both in terms of defining Kyrgyzstan as a space as 
well as assessing the development of the modern Kyrgyz nation and state. In this sense, Kyrgyz 
is taken to mean the titular ethnicity for which the republic is named rather than citizens of the 
Republic; the Kyrgyz “nationality,” would not emerge in the contemporary sense until after the 
region was brought under Russian control in the late 19th century.176  
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Mongols, Tsars, and Soviets 
The ancestry of the modern Kyrgyz can be traced to the Turkic tribes of Altai and Irtysh, 
the Mongols, and the other ancient peoples of the Tian Shan region.177 The Kyrgyz developed a 
shared ethnic consciousness surrounding these very mountains, nomadic pastoralism, and the 
epic hero Manas, however this shared sense of ethnicity was not codified into proto-nationalism 
until the area fell under Russian control in the 1870s.178 Russian settlement in the region caused 
tensions, which came to a head during widespread violence following Tsar Nicolas II’s 
imposition of labor conscription in 1916. An estimated 120,000 Kyrgyz were killed by Russians 
while many others fled or perished en-route to western China.179   
 Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the modern state boundaries of Kyrgyzstan 
were formally codified – first in 1924 as the Kara-Kirgiz autonomous region of the USSR’s 
Turkestan Republic, and then again in 1936 as the Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic (See 
Appendix C). Despite being so-named for the titular ethnicity around which the state was 
constructed, early administration of the Republic was carried out by ethnic Slavs and Tatars 
transplanted into the region, despite the initial communist party cadres being mostly ethnic 
Kyrgyz.180 While Russification began in earnest during the initial years of Russian rule, it 
intensified measurably under Stalin with purges of Kyrgyz cadres and the continued in-migration 
of ethnic Slavs, who concentrated around major urban centers of power -  such as the capital, 
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Frunze.181 This was accompanied the continued out-migration of Kyrgyz nomads to China, 
Russian consolidation of power within the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, and extensive efforts 
by Soviet authorities to eradicate Kyrgyz culture while coopting its symbolism.182 During the 
Second World War, Kyrgyzstan also saw the in-migration of other Soviet nationalities and ethnic 
groups, including forcibly relocated Volga Germans, Koreans, and Caucasians.183 From the late 
1950s until the late 1980s, the Kyrgyz would only comprise a 40-47% plurality of their so-named 
national republic.184 
 Uzbeks concentrated in the South were not immune to Soviet campaigns of repression 
either. Campaigns of religious repression specifically targeted the “regions around the Fergana 
Valley where Islam was much stronger and where the old ways retained their influence.”185 
These efforts were met with creative resistance; pilgrimages to the Throne of Solomon 
(Sulieman-Too) in Osh “intensified during the Soviet period as an alternative to making haj in 
Mecca.”186 The Uzbeks also suffered at the hands of the Kyrgyz, who despite themselves being 
deferential to ethnic Russians, politically dominated Uzbek-majority administrative regions in 
the south through schemes involving rejiggering of administrative apparatuses to over-represent 
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ethnically Kyrgyz constituents.187 By the outbreak of significant interethnic violence in Osh and 
the surrounding area in 1990, Uzbeks comprised 26% of the population of Osh oblast but held 
only 4% of  key government posts in the region.188 By contrast, Uzbeks controlled up to 80% of 
trade and commerce in the region; by the late 1980s this perceived or actual inequality resulted 
increased resentment by Kyrgyz struggling with the effects of perestroika.189 
Nationalism Rekindled 
 Modern Kyrgyz nationalism lay dormant until the 1980s, emerging by the end of the 
decade with decidedly cultural and economic aspects. One of the most prominent calls for a 
rediscovering of national identity came from Kyrgyz novelist Chingiz Aitmatov. Drawing upon 
the Epic of Manas, Aitmatov decried decades of Russification in The Day Lasts More than a 
Hundred Years (1980). He likened the people of Central Asia to mankurts – unthinking slaves 
who have no memories or conceptions of culture, heritage, or self. 190 Aitmatov’s work proved 
incisive in the leadup to Soviet collapse. Some ethnically Kyrgyz party officials could not even 
address their countrymen in Kyrgyz; a significant portion of urban membership in new 
nationalist organizations were similarly “Russified.”191 With increasing pressure and nationalist 
sentiment, 1989 saw the adoption of a new language law. Kyrgyz became the official state 
language, while Russian was reserved as the language of inter-ethnic communication. By 
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contrast, Uzbek was afforded no such provisions. This angered many Uzbek residents of Jalal 
Abad and Osh oblasts.192 Implementation of the new law was ultimately banal; the most 
significant expression of involved public spaces such as streets and squares being renamed in 
Kyrgyz.193 Despite such banality, the new law contributed to the reemergence of long-simmering 
ethno-regional tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.  
A key aspect of emerging nationalist sentiment among ethnic Kyrgyz was directly tied to 
an economic downturn including rampant rural unemployment, low salaries, and a 1990 
economic crisis.194 In the south, unemployment rates rose as high as 23% during this period.195 
With squatter settlements forming on the outskirts of cities by the late 1980s, land reform 
movements were organized around alleviating housing concerns by forcing the state to formalize 
shantytowns, provide land for construction of new housing, or provide suitable housing to 
Kyrgyz migrants arriving in Kyrgyz cities – primarily Frunze and Osh.196 In arguing for pro-
Kyrgyz land reform, the Frunze-based “Ashar” (Solidarity) political organization adopted a 
decidedly nationalist tone by exploiting rumors about the reputed plans of the government to 
help resettle Armenian refugees from conflict in the South Caucasus.197 Ashar was eventually 
successful in its demands. Acceptance by the government of Ashar likewise established the 
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precedent for the founding of over a three-dozen new political organizations within a year, many 
explicitly nationalist.198 Ashar would eventually morph into the Democratic Movement of 
Kyrgyzstan (DDK). DDK rapidly grew to be one of the largest and most prominent of these 
organizations, going from 300 delegates from around the country to over 100,000 members in a 
three-month period in 1990. DDK advocated civil society, market-economic reform, sovereignty, 
and the reassertion of Kyrgyz history and identity.199  
 In Osh the issue of land reform proved more capricious. Local politicians adopted 
stridently anti-Uzbek or anti-Kyrgyz rhetoric in arguments over land reform and political 
representation, many of which played on economic disparities between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz 
which were being reinforced by perestroika’s privatization drive. Ashar’s parallel organization in 
Osh, Osh Aimagy, demanded land for economically displaced Kyrgyz families who had recently 
arrived in the city. The local party chief appropriated 32 hectares of land from a predominately-
Uzbek collective farm, which angered Uzbeks.200 The Uzbek-nationalist group “Adolat” (Justice) 
in-turn aired their longstanding political grievances, demanding greater cultural and political 
representation as well as recognition of Uzbek as an official language in south Kyrgyzstan.201 In 
some cases demands included the creation of an Uzbek autonomous region in south Kyrgyzstan 
if not outright reunification of Uzbek-majority areas with Uzbekistan.202 While the ethno-
regional cleavages between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks had remained muted during the leadup to 
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independence, the language law in concert with economic strife and attempts at land reform 
proved a catalyst for explosive violence. 
Violence and Independence 
The image of Kyrgyzstan as a peaceful backwater of the USSR was shattered in early 
June of 1990, when an outbreak of intercommunal political violence in Osh between Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks resulted in several hundred casualties.203 While the local KGB office had warned of 
tensions, the warning went ignored by officials. Fighting between local youths – which had been 
sporadic -  quickly devolved into violent rioting across the region following an altercation at the 
bazaar and bus station in nearby Uzgen.204 Riots began on June 4th and intensified quickly; they 
came to involve participation by local police on behalf of their respective ethnicity, as well as 
looting, destruction of property, rape, and murder in both Osh and Uzgen as well as the 
surrounding countryside.205 Harkening to the Israelites of yore, some Kyrgyz were instructed to 
paint their doors red in order to spare their homes and property from destruction.206 Rioting was 
finally halted on June 8th by Soviet paratroopers, who deployed within hours of initial violence 
with orders to use lethal force to quell the violence, if necessary.207  
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At the conclusion of violence, official estimates placed casualties at between 200 and 
600, however unofficial estimates allege up to 1,000 killed.208 The aftermath of the riots resulted 
in 4,000 investigated incidents, with 3,125 officially registered crimes.209 Young men perpetrated 
a majority of the violence, many of whom were allegedly intoxicated during the rioting.210 While 
the riots were officially investigated by a court and saw 48 prosecutions with 46 convictions – 
primarily convictions of ethnic Kyrgyz for violent crimes, they nonetheless are viewed as 
establishing the precedent for the 2010 violence in Osh following the ouster of President Bakiev 
– if not being a direction continuation of the 1990s.211 Finally, despite the violence – which was 
predicated upon economic grievances as well as strong ethno-nationalist undertones – clan, 
tribal, and regional loyalties and patronage networks continued to dominate Kyrgyz politics in 
the early 1990s despite nascent nationalism.212  
Following the 1990 riots, a series of other challenges presented themselves in 
Kyrgyzstan. The ouster of then-Secretary of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan - Absamat 
Masaliyev – was hastened by the 1990 riots in his home city of Osh. Efforts to oust Masaliyev 
also demonstrated further ethno-regional cleavages among the ruling elite.213 The traditionally-
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powerful Osh-bloc of southern elites faced new challenges from the Naryn-bloc of the east.214 
Southern elites, concerned with their diminishing power, advocated devolution and power 
sharing schemes including the administrative restructuring of the republic into a northern and 
southern region with equal representation in legislative bodies. Other schemes called for further 
devolution and dissolution of power ranging from a federation of two coequal republics to the 
creation of five autonomous regions within the republic – one for each oblast at the time – under 
a confederation coordinated by a rotating presidency.215 As Eugene Huskey notes:  
“The advocates of devolution and power-sharing are motivated less by a desire 
to promote regional social and economic development than to protect local 
political networks.”216  
Beyond exposing regional cleavages, the early 1990s also exposed major urban-rural divides 
within the political structure of the country. The 1990 Osh riots were a partial manifestation of 
this. Furthermore, while Russified, urban Kyrgyz based in Frunze remained in firm control of the 
political apparatus and nationalist movement by 1992, they were nonetheless perceived as 
vulnerable to non-urban nationalists and populists.217 In both cases, the proliferation of political 
parties ensured difficulties in maintaining a multiethnic ruling coalition.218 The Osh events of 
1990 in concert with “political infighting,” between regionally aligned blocs – primarily Osh and 
Naryn – forced the government to schedule elections for October.219 
                                                 
214 Rashid, Islam or Nationalism?, 145–47. 
215 Huskey, “Demographic and Economic Frustration,” 664–65. 
216 Huskey, 665. 
217 Huskey, 665. 
218 Huskey, 665. 
219 Rashid, Islam or Nationalism?, 147. 
70 
 
 Nineteen Ninety saw the election of Askar Akaev – the first non-CPK member to be 
elected President of the Republic.220 With a background in physics, mathematics, and academia, 
he stood as a stark contrast to his predecessor.221 Akaev supported some aspects of perestroika, 
despite the potentially negative ramifications for the Kyrgyz economy.222 He likewise backed 
Gorbachev during the 1991 coup attempt, declaring independence immediately following the 
coup - having declared Kyrgyzstan sovereign less than a year prior.223 During the coup, Akaev 
deployed military units around the newly-renamed capital (Bishkek) to prevent a local iteration; 
once the dust settled in Moscow, he officially outlawed the CPK.224 Later that year he would be 
reelected President of the newly-independent republic after running unopposed.225  
The Switzerland of the East? 
The collapse of the Soviet Union presented a range of challenges for Central Asia, with 
Kyrgyzstan being no exception. While Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan could rely on 
their vast hydrocarbon and mineral wealth, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were less fortunate in that 
regard. In Tajikistan, the collapse in state capacity associated with a budget crisis – 
approximately 46%  of the budget came from Moscow – a lack of exploitable resources, and 
structural instability as a result of exclusionary ethno-regionalist politics all contributed to the 
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onset of civil war.226 In Kyrgyzstan, the Akaev’s government attempted to head off these issues 
by embarking on massive privatization drives – particularly in the agricultural and real estate 
sectors - as well as by seeking extensive assistance in the form of foreign aid.227 Many of the 
foreign aid relationships established by the Akaev government between Kyrgyzstan and the 
United States, Turkey, and China persist to this day. While a considerable portion of this aid was 
based on a romanticized Western notion of Kyrgyzstan as Central Asia’s “island of democracy,” 
early-independence Kyrgyzstan still stood in stark contrast to its staunchly authoritarian 
neighbors – with a robust free press, political and economic liberalization, and civil and political 
liberties unmatched in the region.228 
Problems quickly emerged in newly independent Kyrgyzstan despite a promising start to 
independence. One area of concern was the outmigration of ethnic Slavs and Germans. By 1993 
approximately 100,000 ethnic Slavs had emigrated, accompanied by half of the country’s 
population of 100,000 ethnic Germans; this emigration represented a drain of political and 
economic resources and expertise which some Kyrgyz elite viewed with concern.229 By contrast, 
the continued dominance of non-Kyrgyz ethnicities across many high-skill and government 
sectors served as a rallying point for Kyrgyz nationalism and continued backlash against ethnic 
Slavs.230  This is to say nothing of the challenges faced in Osh in the South in terms of ethnic 
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tensions; despite the end of hostilities and a 1991 agreement redressing local concerns of 
political and cultural representation for Uzbeks, “Osh was a city where ethnic apartheid was 
vehemently practiced by both Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.”231 This apartheid developed a distinctly 
spatial element as well in the form of political redistricting designed to favor Kyrgyz 
neighborhoods for municipal services while excluding Uzbeks.232 Conditions for southern 
Uzbeks had so-deteriorated by the mid-1990s that there were renewed calls for separatism.233 
Small communities of Russians in the south remained insular as well – abstaining from the 1995 
elections en-masse.234 
Religious challenges also emerged in the early years of independence, particularly with 
an influx of Christian and Muslim missionaries. Among the Christians, this included 
missionaries from Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Movement as well as Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Pentecostals, and other evangelical Christian groups.235 Among Muslim missionaries, Wahhabis 
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were highly active in proselytization as well. The latter efforts were more pronounced in the 
Ferghana Valley in the south where audiences tended to be more receptive.236 Such efforts were 
likewise accompanied by a construction boom of mosques and madrasas, often funded by foreign 
money.237 Throughout the 1990s, concerns also arose from militant fundamentalist activity in 
surrounding countries, including the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) 
in Tajikistan, and the IMU. While the latter would violate Kyrgyz territorial sovereignty in the 
late 1990s, internally fundamentalism failed to take hold in any capacity which threatened 
overall state stability.238 As Ahmed Rashid notes, rather than being an outright political force 
Islam provided “a means to break with the communist past rather than a means to a new political 
future.”239 Nonetheless, as with other post-Soviet states religious revival unnerved secular 
officialdom; by 1996 a series of new laws against foreign religious proselytization were 
implemented by the Akaev government – a policy mirrored in Russia in 1997.240  
The greatest challenges to emerge in newly independent Kyrgyzstan, however, involved 
the nature of the Kyrgyz state itself. For one, rapid economic and political liberalization proved 
more challenging than anticipated by the Akaev regime – who now sought to balance domestic 
political and economic concerns with the terms of the half-billion US dollars in outside foreign 
aid the country received between 1991 and 1994.241 These economic concerns correlated with a 
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rightward shift in Kyrgyz politics in 1994, involving Akaev shuttering several opposition 
newspapers and calling a popular referendum resulting in the redrafting of the constitution – 
itself in violation of the constitution.242 This is to say nothing of the corruption which publicly 
emerged following Soviet collapse. Akaev was equally culpable despite his complaints – packing 
his cabinet with personal friends. Having become isolated from other elected officials, Akaev 
attempted to govern through local and oblast-level politicians, banking on the continued power 
of patronage across the country.243 The 1996 referendum on another constitutional redraft – one 
which would further broaden Akaev’s power - saw levels of turnout (96.5%) common in 
anocracies and autocracies. The election was likely fraudulent.244  
Beyond domestic political concerns, the late 1990s demonstrated the challenges faced by 
the Kyrgyz state in dealing with neighbors. In 1999 two crises involving the border between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan rocked south Kyrgyzstan. In February of 1999, Uzbekistan’s 
government unilaterally closed the border – citing security concerns after a string of bombings 
and an assassination attempt on Uzbek president Islam Karimov in Tashkent - blamed on the 
IMU.245 Uzbekistan proceeded to re-define the border, annexing Kyrgyz land that had been 
leased to Uzbekistan for livestock grazing during the Soviet Union. Uzbek demarcation resulted 
in the creation of Kyrgyz exclaves in the region – completely disconnected from Kyrgyz 
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territory.246 August of 1999 brought further crisis and incursion along the border, when IMU 
guerillas tore through Batken, in the process taking four Japanese geologists and several Kyrgyz 
– including a high-ranking military commander – hostage.247 This incursion by the IMU saw 
Uzbek military and police forces pursuing the guerillas into Kyrgyz territory. In the process, 
Uzbek government forces entrenched and laid mines – establishing semi-permanent redoubts 
which further exacerbated interstate tensions between the two countries.248  Uzbek forces also 
strafed Kyrgyz villages under IMU control, killing Kyrgyz civilians in the process.249 Four 
thousand civilians fled to the surrounding mountains to avoid the fighting.250   
The crisis was resolved in October of Nineteen Ninety-nine. The militants successfully 
managed to ransom both the Japanese geologists and the Kyrgyz government officials – at other 
times freeing hostages as they retreated. The Kyrgyz government paid $50,000 for four hostages 
initially taken by the IMU.  Japan paid between two and six million dollars for the return of its 
citizens. Remaining IMU fighters were allowed passage to Tajikistan and later Afghanistan, 
where they were welcomed with open arms by the Taliban.251 The following year a group of 
mountain climbers including four Americans were taken hostage were kidnapped in Kyrgyzstan 
by the IMU, escaping after they pushed their guard off a cliff and were rescued by Kyrgyz 
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special forces.252 This was the last major high-profile incident involving the IMU in south 
Kyrgyzstan.  
The Batken Crisis of 1999 is important in that it demonstrated the challenges faced by 
Kyrgyzstan’s government in maintaining internal sovereignty and quickly and competently 
addressing crises. Kyrgyzstan’s response to IMU incursions and hostage-taking bordered on 
comical in terms of incompetence. Conscript units tasked with handling the situation were in 
some cases so poorly equipped that they were required to scrounge their own food – with one 
unit reportedly spending a half day hunting and barbequing mountain goats. An additional 
$420,000 in cash was reallocated from government coffers and quite literally put in a briefcase to 
pay ransom for the remaining hostages. It would later be alleged that in an act of particular 
skullduggery, Akaev and his Chief-of-Staff Medet Sadyrkulov utilized the money to bribe a 
foreign journalist who was preparing to publish an in-depth analysis of the Akaev family’s 
finances, business dealings, and high-level corruption. Akaev calculated that such an expose 
might harm his chances at reelection.253  
Revolution 
Akaev’s corruption and anocratic tendencies led to his ouster in the Tulip Revolution of 
2005.254 His anocratic streak had persisted through the 1995 and 2000 elections, as well as in the 
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interim. After ceding a piece of disputed territory to China in 2002, opposition leaders led by 
Azimbek Beknazarov called for Akaev’s impeachment based on the secrecy of the terms under 
which the deal was reached; they played upon traditional tropes of Kyrgyz nationalism, such as 
Manas expelling the kitais – Chinese – from premodern Kyrgyzstan. The Akaev government 
reacted by attempting to discredit and jail Beknazarov, resulting in protests and his eventual 
release.255 The Akaev government also sought to ban another leading opposition politician – 
Roza Otunbayeva – from running for parliament on absurd technicalities, namely that she did not 
meet residency requirements to run for office based on her years of service as an overseas 
diplomat.256 The 2005 parliamentary elections would prove the straw that broke the camel’s back 
for the Akaev regime. 
The first round of balloting on February 27th saw vocal criticism of ballot-rigging and 
other anti-democratic behaviors by international election monitors.257 In addition to a near-clean 
sweep by establishment candidates, including the president’s children, a number of other issues 
presented themselves.258 Foreign observers noted disqualification of opposition candidates on 
technicalities, harassment of independent media and support of the government by state-run 
outlets, and outright vote-buying on both sides.259 
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By February 28th protests had started in Osh province.260 Several days later a grenade was 
thrown onto the balcony of Roza Otunbayeva’s apartment and exploded, resulting in minor 
damage and no injuries; the government denied responsibility for the attack.261 Large protests 
which began in Jalal-Abad on March 5th spread to neighboring Osh by the 9th, with major swaths 
of south Kyrgyzstan falling out of government control within two weeks of initial protests.262 
During this period, protests also reached Bishkek. By the afternoon of March 24th, Akaev and his 
family fled first to Kazakhstan, and later to Russia. The Kyrgyz Supreme Court nullified the 
results of the parliamentary elections the same day. During this period, a potential counter-
revolution of northern Akaev supporters emerged, but quickly halted their attempts after former 
government officials intervened.263 On April 4th, Akaev resigned from Moscow – never to return 
to Kyrgyzstan.264 
Kurmanbek Bakiev – a powerful southern politician and key opposition leader during the 
revolution – succeeded Askar Akaev. Reform under Bakiev failed to materialize; he would prove 
equally if not more corrupt than Akaev. This corruption was accompanied by increasingly erratic 
paranoia, curbs on civil liberties, and harassment, imprisonment, and outright murder of 
journalists and opposition figures.265 He also enacted policies which resulted in increased energy 
costs, including raising the price of electricity. Bakiev’s behavior even concerned the Russians to 
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the point that they began airing ads against him on local TV in Bishkek in the lead up to the 
Second Kyrgyz Revolution.266 Protests against Bakiev began in Bishkek on April 3rd of 2010, 
five years after Akaev’s official resignation. Protests quickly spread across the country as they 
grew in Bishkek, with increasingly violent clashes between protestors and security services. By 
April 7th, protestors were being killed by snipers as they attempted to storm the presidential 
palace; Bakiev had ordered use of lethal force.267 Bakiev would flee to his family compound in 
Teyit village outside Jalal-Abad on the same day.268 On April 8th, Bakiev attempted to rally 
support in his home province for a counter-revolution, but ultimately failed. By the 16th he 
officially resigned.269 
Despite Bakiev’s resignation, unrest continued for several months following the 
revolution. The interim government was dysfunctional; it could barely manage itself let alone the 
affairs of the state.270 While Bakiev had fled to Belarus – Europe’s last dictatorship – his allies in 
Kyrgyzstan sought to sow chaos across the south. On May 13th Bakiev supporters seized several 
municipal buildings across southern provinces under the direction of the President’s brother as 
well as his chief of staff.271 Security forces recaptured buildings in Osh and Jalal-Abad the 
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following day.272 Opposition politicians played a key role in directing security service efforts; 
police and military units were initially reluctant to respond.273 In Jalal-Abad, security services 
were aided by approximately 3,000 armed irregulars fielded by opposition politicians. Over half 
of these individuals were associated with the Uzbek-dominated Rodina party – led by Kadyrjan 
Batyrov. That evening, Bakiev family compounds were torched – allegedly by Uzbek mobs 
under the direction of Batyrov. This angered many southern Kyrgyz and resulted in a flare-up in 
ethnic violence on May 19th following several days of protest and the ransacking of the Batyrov-
funded Kyrgyz-Uzbek University of People’s Friendship – which would itself be torched during 
inter-ethnic violence the following month.274 Batyrov fled the arson charges and his arrest and is 
now believed to be living in Dubai. The April revolution and May events had resulted in 
renewed ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbek and would ultimately serve as a catalyst for 
extreme violence across south Kyrgyzstan the following month.275  
Echoes of 1990 
 By June, south Kyrgyzstan was on edge. Ethnic tensions were at levels unseen since the 
events of 1990. The events of May were followed by a series of minor inter-ethnic clashes – 
which gradually escalated in scope and scale. On June 9th a fight outside a chaykhana (teahouse) 
in western Osh city drew a large crowd of several hundred. Another alleged incident involved a 
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fight which began after a revenge killing “by one ethnic group against a man who had beaten up 
a prostitute at a hotel.”276  
On the evening of June 10th violence erupted in Osh. That evening, a clash occurred 
outside the Al-Bukhari mosque. It drew a large crowd of 1000 – half Kyrgyz, half Uzbek. Shops 
were looted and approximately fifty individuals engaged in a brawl. Later that evening, a 
gambling dispute between a group of young Uzbek and Kyrgyz men quickly devolved into 
another street brawl. Later reports point to this as the trigger event which incited a week of 
widespread inter-ethnic violence. The brawl quickly grew into a riot which drew opposing 
crowds armed with crude weapons. Security forces were unable to quell the fighting, which had 
drawn large groups of young, unemployed men who had been loitering in the area. A false rumor 
that a group of Uzbek men had raped and murdered a Kyrgyz woman residing in a nearby 
university dormitory drew out more Kyrgyz young men. By the early hours of June 11th, the 
situation was out of control; the official report notes that the violence “metastasized with 
alarming speed.”277 By June 12th violence would spread to Jalal-Abad, as well as surrounding 
rural areas.278 
The ensuing violence remains difficult to capture in brevity.279 It was extreme, targeted, 
and well organized in nature. Mobs of young Kyrgyz men roamed the streets targeting Uzbek 
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businesses and neighborhoods – later reinforced by individuals from outlying districts arriving to 
avenge attacks or rapes of Kyrgyz by Uzbeks. Witnesses to the incidents describe squad-to-
platoon sized elements under the direction of a single individual systematically moving through 
Uzbek mahallas (districts or neighborhoods) while being consistently resupplied with food, 
water, vodka, flammable liquids, and firearms and ammunition. A significant number of firearms 
were looted from security forces, while others were said to be distributed by local, regional, and 
national politicians from the region. Mobs also employed pickup trucks and armored personnel 
carriers (APCs), the latter of which were seized from security forces. In some cases, APCs were 
provided to mobs by security forces; some members of security forces themselves participated in 
the looting and razing of mahallas alongside marauders (See Appendix F).280 During this period, 
Uzbeks reacted by barricading and attempting to defend their neighborhoods, sometimes 
returning fire against Kyrgyz mobs. In areas outside the city, Uzbeks established ad-hoc 
checkpoints along roadways. Uzbeks also engaged in retaliatory violence against Kyrgyz during 
the riots, however it appears less coordinated. Over the course of the rioting, both parties – and 
sometimes the security services - were guilty of assault, hostage-taking, rape and other sexual 
violence, and murder. While some of the looting and violence was likely opportunistic, Kyrgyz 
violence against Uzbeks was well coordinated if not previously planned.281  
The response by the interim government proved ineffective if not incompetent. Security-
services were marshalled to defend government buildings rather than intervene and halt violence 
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– in stark contrast to the 1990 violence.282 One of the largest and most distressing criticisms of 
security services during the violence is that they often surrendered their weapons without 
incident to rioters. Rioters obtained hundreds of government light arms – pistols, Kalashnikov 
rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, and even mortars – as well as thousands of rounds of 
ammunition from police and military units. More concerning, security forces themselves 
participated in violence, rape, and looting – based on opportunism and/or shared sentiment. Even 
following the end of rioting, some members of the security services perpetrated kidnapping for 
ransom and sexual extortion. As per the official report, government officials and institutions bore 
significant responsibility for the violence based on lack of coordination, incompetence, and a 
lack of leadership.283 Official explanations for violence tended to blame outside forces, ranging 
from Bakiev to the Taliban and the IMU. Many government officials themselves blamed Uzbeks 
– accusing them of planning the uprising. In a further tone-deaf move, on June 27th, less than a 
month after the violence, the government also insisted holding a referendum on the new 
constitution based on a need to cultivate legitimacy. The referendum saw high turnout nationally 
according to the government, yet Osh had the lowest levels of participation anywhere in the 
country. International election monitors noted minor concerns but otherwise allowed the 
referendum to proceed unhindered.284 
Violence ended between June 14th and June 16th. The violence and the aftermath saw 
significant numbers of IDPs and refugees, with up to 120,000 Uzbek women, children, and 
elderly fleeing the fighting by crossing the border into neighboring Uzbekistan. 80,000 returned 
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in the immediate aftermath of the violence.285 Approximately 2,700 buildings were destroyed, 
resulting in 75,000 displaced people. Estimated death tolls ranged from the official 839 to an 
excess of 2000.286 Among 426 officially registered corpses, approximately 90% were identified; 
105 of the identified were Kyrgyz while 276 were Uzbek. Of approximately 2,000 officially 
counted injuries, almost half suffered from gunshot wounds. The official international inquiry 
published in May of 2011 estimated total financial damage at approximately $81,000,000 USD. 
Finally, post-violence assessments do not provide an adequate assessment of the sexual and 
gender-based violence which occurred during and after the rioting.287 Under-reporting is judged 
as the result of social stigmas, weak reporting mechanisms, and continued discrimination against 
women and the Uzbek community.288  
In the days and weeks following the conflict, the Kyrgyz government engaged in large-
scale sweep operations to apprehend those responsible for the violence; they would 
disproportionately target Uzbeks. These operations saw rampant police abuse, extortion, torture, 
and confessions obtained under duress. By December, authorities had initiated over 5,000 
investigations related to the June 2010 violence. These investigations were distributed between 
Osh city (2,990), Osh oblast (1,227), and Jalal-Abad (900). Over 3,500 of these investigations 
were dropped based on the lack of an identifiable suspect. Of the criminal charges to result from 
these investigations, 79% of those charged were Uzbek, 18% were Kyrgyz, and 2% were of other 
ethnicities. Of the 27 individuals charged with murder, 24 were identified as Uzbek and 2 were 
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identified as Kyrgyz.289 Several months following the events, 71 individuals had been officially 
charged with murder; of this total 83% were Uzbek and 10% were Kyrgyz. Most cases were 
investigated by Kyrgyz-dominated police forces, and all cases were tried in front of Kyrgyz 
judges.290 Incidentally, this was cited by some officials as a cause of inter-ethnic animus in the 
first place. One official noted that the entire legal system – the police, the courts, and the 
prosecutors – was dominated by and served the interests of ethnic Kyrgyz; he further postulated 
that it was little wonder Uzbeks harbored skepticism of the government and furthermore self-
armed in order to defend themselves.291 
The 2010 ethnic violence which terrorized south Kyrgyzstan deepened existing divisions 
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, and further diminished government legitimacy in the south. 
Months on from the event, further political fallout would emerge after the government attempted 
and failed to remove the Mayor of Osh –Kyrgyz nationalist politician Melis Myrzakmatov – due 
to internal feuding among government officials, some of whom supported Myrzakmatov.292 
Myrzakmatov posed a consistent challenge to central authority in the region, with some outside 
observers fearing that his hardline-nationalist rhetoric may reignite interethnic violence.293 He 
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was finally removed from office in 2013, and lost his reelection bid to a pro-government 
candidate.294  
Over a year after the 2010 violence, Kyrgyzstan held its first elections under the new 
constitution on October 30th, 2011. Interim President Roza Otunbayeva stepped down instead of 
seeking election. Interim Prime Minister Almazbek Atambayev won the in the first round of 
voting – winning 60% of the total vote in a national election with approximately 57% turnout 
and a pronounced north/south split in terms of preferred candidate. Atambayev defeated two 
prominent nationalist politicians on a pro-Russia platform which included closing the US airbase 
at Manas International Airport outside Bishkek and naming a mountain in Kyrgyzstan after 
Vladimir Putin. Russia’s backing of Atambayev likely contributed to his victory in a country 
where many voters support Russia and Putin. The election did see voting irregularities, and 
several opposition candidates alleged election fraud and vowed protests. Nonetheless, 
Atambayev successfully assumed the Presidency and served a six-year term before stepping 
down as constitutionally mandated.295  
Atambayev was replaced in 2017 by Prime Minister Sooronbay Jeenbekov in what was 
termed “the first genuinely competitive presidential election in Central Asia.”296 Jeenbekov 
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unexpectedly won with approximately 55% of the vote across the country compared to the 34% 
won by his primary opponent, Omurbek Babanov.297 Despite improvements from the 2011 
election, there were still significant allegations of electoral misconduct including the arrest of 
Babanov supporters and the jailing of opposition leader Omurbek Tekebayev. Jeenbekov also 
vowed to imprison Babanov on corruption charges during a televised debate. Jeenbekov’s party 
is further alleged to have engaged in vote buying and instructing civil servants to vote for him. 
Other candidates resorted to smear tactics, attacking Babanov’s ethnic heritage and false reports 
claiming he was attempting to incite the Uzbeks.298 In a further twist, after assuming the 
presidency Jeenbekov’s administration has opened corruption investigations into members of the 
Atambayev administration, including the former President himself. Charges range from standard-
fare money laundering to fraud in infrastructure, development, and foreign military sales.299 One 
particularly notable incident involved the failure of a brand new Chinese-constructed powerplant 
in the middle of January of 2017 – leaving many Bishkek residents without heat or electricity.300 
Two officials implicated in the incident are currently facing twenty-year prison terms.301 Still, 
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these investigations appear to be politically targeted considering alleged corruption within the 
new administration including the appointment of former Bakiev officials as well as the 
distribution of key political posts through patronage networks. This is to say nothing of the 
entrenched corruption within state institutions themselves, and the continued reliance of Kyrgyz 
politicians on clan and patronage networks.302 
Over nearly thirty years of independence, the Kyrgyz Republic has developed 
significantly as an independent country. It also continues to face significant challenges. 
Particularly post-independence, this history has played a key role in shaping the Kyrgyz 
Republic as the space it is today. This history also gives context to the place and space of the 
Republic and helps elucidate both existing scholarship and firsthand observations on the nature 
of the Republic as a political-geographic space. In observing this history, there are several key 
takeaways.  Foremost is that the Republic occupies the space of what one interviewee termed the 
“experimental state.”303 It stands in contrast to its autocratic neighbors in the sense that it is a 
democracy, but also mirrors them in terms of anocratic tendencies and political systems 
embroiled in corruption and closely tied to kinship and patronage networks. Nonetheless, 
Kyrgyzstan has sought to break the status quo by experimenting with periodic restricting of 
government and the state constitution since initial independence in 1991. The other critical 
takeaway from observing thirty years of Kyrgyzstan’s history is that like many other relatively 
young states, it has consistently struggled to cultivate state capacity due to a variety of 
geographic, political, social, and economic factors. While things have improved since 1990, 
                                                 
302 Aidar, “Alleged Elite Corruption.” 
303 Emil Dzhuraev, Interview with Emil Dzhuraev, interview by Christopher Cowan, In-Person, July 4, 2018. 
89 
 
1999, and 2010, there are still areas of the country where the capacity of the state and the 
authority of the Bishkek central government is lacking – particularly in the geographically 
disconnected south. This struggle to cultivate capacity has been an omnipresent if not defining 
theme of post-Soviet politics in Kyrgyzstan and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.  
Kyrgyzstan as a Space 
 Beyond an extensive review of the history and politics of the Republic, as scholarship in 
Geography it is critical to provide context for Kyrgyzstan as a space. Elements of this 
characterization are closely tied to the physical, historical, human, and political geography of the 
country. What’s more, defining Kyrgyzstan as a space provides the basis for interrogating the 
critical themes of this research - namely the role of transnational processes in shaping space and 
notions of state capacity and the “experimental state.” The spaces discussed in this section 
should be thought of as both nested and scalar; some exist at local and regional scales whereas 
others span multiple regions and even extend to the national scale.304 These characterizations are 
rooted in existing scholarship on the Republic, but more importantly rely upon firsthand 
observations recorded during fieldwork. 
Central Asia and Post-Soviet 
 Based on its geographic situation, history, and culture, Kyrgyzstan can foremost be 
classified as a uniquely Central Asian space. In the popular imagination these characterizations 
of space draw inspiration from the Silk Routes of yore. The local tourism industry has indeed 
capitalized on this narrative; promotional materials for the “land of celestial mountains,” tout 
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yurts, horse culture, and unspoiled blue-sky vistas of mountains and steppe. While cliché, these 
narratives serve as a useful basis for more broadly situating Kyrgyzstan as a Central Asian space 
based on its geography, language, culture, history, and politics.  
 Beyond its situation within Central Asia as a region, geographically Kyrgyzstan exhibits 
numerous similarities to its co-regionalists. In terms of physical geography, terrain is defined by 
mountains and steppe as well as several Köppen climate zones shared by neighboring countries. 
Language also contributes to this ideation of space. Apart from Tajikistan, the Republic shares a 
Turkic language with its co-regionalists. It likewise shares similar culinary traditions, which 
place a heavy emphasis on meat, bread, and dairy. While the Tajiks and Uzbeks were the first 
settled peoples of the region, Kyrgyzstan shares nomadic heritage with Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan. At one point, there was little distinction between Kazakh and Kyrgyz – both of 
whom were simply referred to as “Kyrgyz.”305 When the Soviets drew borders, the steppe 
Kyrgyz would become the Kazakhs, whereas the mountain Kyrgyz would remain Kyrgyz.  
The political-geographic space of the Kyrgyz Republic also exhibits distinct hallmarks of 
Central Asian-ness. As noted previously, anocratic tendencies contribute to this ideation of 
space, as do efforts to cultivate new nationalism following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Like 
neighboring Tajikistan, are strong north/south regional cleavages.306 The phenomenon of 
political organization along ethno-regional lines is shared between the two countries; these 
identities play a key role in the formation of political-geographic space and have also served as a 
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historical catalyst for violence.307 Like neighbors in the region, politics are likewise closely tied 
to clan loyalties, kinship ties, and patronage networks.308 A concept familiar to scholars of 
Southwest Asia and North Africa, this closely resembles wasta, or “who you know.”309 This 
often translates into corruption. Thus, much like the other political-geographic spaces of Central 
Asia, Kyrgyzstan is a space shaped by a political system closely linked to organized crime and 
likewise defined by significant levels of corruption and abuse of public resources.310 As noted, in 
Kyrgyzstan organized crime is merely “politics by other means.”311Corruption is a way to make 
a living – particularly as an under-compensated civil servant (See Appendix G).  
Like other spaces in Central Asia there is also an element of absurdity to the Republic. 
Popular conceptions of this absurdity trend toward the simplistic; when many people imagine the 
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former Soviet Union – especially Central Asia - they picture a corrupt, dysfunctional backwater 
attempting to reconcile the Soviet past with the post-Soviet present.312  While there is plenty 
worth satirizing, this discussion is not intended to explore the geopolitics of satire as they pertain 
to Kyrgyzstan as a Central Asian space.313 Rather, it is intended to discuss the unique 
observations of daily oddities and absurdities in the Republic that endear it to travelers and 
present similar examples across the region – from slightly-off copies of global brands to creative 
blends of tradition and modernity - such as sheep secured to the roof-racks of Ladas at livestock 
markets or solar panels affixed to yurts for power to charge cell phones (See Appendix H). 
Nested within this Central Asian space is a distinct aspect of post-Soviet – an aspect of 
space which has played a key role in the development of the Kyrgyz Republic. This manifests 
most-observably on the urban landscape – as noted. In terms of how the Soviet past shaped the 
current political geography of the Republic, bureaucratic institutions and government as well as 
the military retain many aspects of this Soviet past – notably corruption and inefficiency.  
There is also a degree of nostalgia for the Soviet Union; one interviewee noted the belief held by 
some that “things just worked back then.”314 This sentiment was catalogued in a national survey 
in 2014 by Central Asia Barometer, which demonstrated this sentiment among a plurality of 
those surveyed (See Appendix I). While more-rural oblasts such as Naryn, Talas, and Batken 
demonstrated less “nostalgia,” oblasts with larger and more urbanized populations displayed the 
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opposite trend. Age and gender breakdowns also prove insightful on the distribution of this 
sentiment nearly thirty years after the collapse of the USSR.315 
Transition, Transit, and Exchange 
 A further dimension to the Republic as a space is the notion that Kyrgyzstan is a space of 
transition, transit and exchange. The notion of transition is closely tied to the post-Soviet space 
of the republic; in thirty years Kyrgyzstan has become independent, experienced two revolutions, 
and refigured its government several times. The economy likewise remains transitional, 
dominated by agriculture, mineral extraction, and remittances from Kyrgyz guest workers 
abroad. In the words of one interviewee, the republic remains an “experimental state.”316  
 Beyond being a space of transition, Kyrgyzstan is also a space of transit and exchange. 
This ideation of space dates at least to the history of the Silk Routes. However, it is also closely 
tied to the nomadic past of the Kyrgyz people – who only became sedentary following the 
imposition of Russian rule. Transit and exchange in the Republic reemerged in force following 
Soviet collapse, and as of late Kyrgyzstan has even emerged as a key trade corridor in Eurasia 
under the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.317  
 That which is transiting and/or being exchanged across this space runs the gamut. While 
this thesis is focused on illicit traffic in narcotics, licit goods such as agricultural products are 
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just as likely to be “smuggled,” as well. Other examples of transit and exchange involve the 
movement of people and capital; the former is largely tied to labor migration of Kyrgyz to 
surrounding states as migrant workers. The latter involves the remittances which these migrants 
send home, as well as less-licit flows of capital. Illicit capital flows come in two categories. The 
first are outflows of state funds pilfered by government elites. Post-independence administrations 
are notorious for this alleged behavior, however only the Bakiev administration has been subject 
to international scrutiny. Regarding the latter category of capital flows, transit of capital typically 
involves inflows of foreign capital or transit of local capital destined to be laundered. Some 
locally based banks such as Asia Universal Bank are alleged to have been established expressly 
for this purpose.  
 Most importantly, it is critical to recognize Kyrgyzstan as a space of transit and exchange 
in terms of ideas. Kyrgyzstan is for better or worse the only democracy in the region – even with 
its flaws, caveats, and anocratic regressions. Democracy has nonetheless persisted despite such 
challenges – facilitated by street protests, printing presses, and ballot boxes. A comparatively 
free press and broad array of civil society institutions ensure a discourse which is robust and 
open compared to neighboring states.  
Contested Space 
 Perhaps the most important space of the Republic is that of contested space. Rather than 
generalize the entire Republic as a contested space, however, it is more useful to view 
Kyrgyzstan as a series of nested spaces of contest spanning the local, regional, and nation-state 
levels. These nested spaces are punctuated by the regional divides between north and south, as 
well as ethnic tensions and debates over nationalism and national identity. Above the nation-state 
level, Kyrgyzstan is also geopolitically contested space. 
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 At the local level the urban landscape presents an observable indicator of contested space 
– transitioning rapidly from the Soviet past to the post-Soviet present in terms of architecture and 
banal attempts at nationalism. Public spaces are especially representative; Manas and a large 
Kyrgyz flag sit proudly in front of the National Museum while Lenin has merely been moved 
behind it (See Appendix J). In other areas, squat khrushyovka apartments and corrugated iron 
convenience stores lay slumped alongside vapid, flashy new high-rise developments and local 
knockoffs of American fast food chains. In the eastern city of Karakol, development is far-less 
gaudy; the largest buildings to dominate the urban landscape are no more than a few stories. 
Single-family compounds and Russian-style homes comprise a bulk of the residential areas – 
interspersed with establishments catering to backpackers as well as several mosques and an 
Orthodox church.  
 The urban character of Osh – a city historically Uzbek in nature – is different entirely 
than that of Bishkek. Low-slung compounds of the Uzbek mahallas are occasionally interrupted 
by taller structures including mosques, universities, or apartment buildings. To a traveler the city 
feels more pious in nature than Bishkek as well, with morning and evening calls to prayer 
audible across the city rather than in isolated neighborhoods of Bishkek. There are other 
indicators of contested space in Osh as well. Most notably, a large Kyrgyz flag flies from a pole 
atop Sulieman-Too – perhaps intended as a reminder that while the city may historically be the 
site of an Uzbek plurality, it nonetheless is under the control of ethnic Kyrgyz. 
 This local example of banal nationalism in south Kyrgyzstan intimates the broader nature 
of contested space at a regional and national scale within the Republic. In practice, this contest is 
observable in the election returns of post-independence politics as well as broader discussions of 
nationalism and identity. Regarding the former, regional divides between north and south 
96 
 
Kyrgyzstan have historically played a significant role in the political geography of the republic, 
with power distributed through regional patronage networks headed by powerful local clans in 
the north and the South. Under the Soviets, southern Kyrgyz retained leadership of the republic; 
following Soviet collapse power shifted to a northern-based block. In subsequent elections, the 
presidency has been passed between regional blocs. Bakiev was from the south, whereas 
Atambayev and Jeenbekov are from the north. As noted, the election of Jeenbekov was the first 
in the history of Kyrgyzstan since initial independence to see broad-based support for the 
president across the country – winning an unexpected victory.318  
 Historically, these north-south cleavages have been pronounced in the aftermath of 
revolution and political violence, as was the case in 2005 and 2010; following the Osh events of 
2010 it took two years for the central government in Bishkek to bring restive Kyrgyz nationalists 
in the south to heel; the government still experiences issues with perceptions of involvement and 
legitimacy in the south. Granted, it has done itself few favors in this regard based on public 
pronouncements and policy directives, which can be viewed as insensitive to southern residents 
based on their targeted contempt for religious and cultural practices. One such incident involved 
then-President Atambayev remarking something to the effect of “women in mini-skirts don’t 
blow themselves up,” when being publicly questioned about a government-sponsored billboard 
campaign against niqab and other conservative veiling practices.319 Absurdities aside, more 
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concerning are recent efforts to ban languages other than Kyrgyz or Russian for religious 
services. Harkening to the language laws of the 1990s, the new law predominately targets 
Uzbeks in the south – the preferred scapegoat of ardent Kyrgyz nationalists.  
Even the nationalists are subject to struggle, however. Manas – the preferred Kyrgyz 
national symbol – has alternatively been appropriated by the Kyrgyz, Chinese, and Russians over 
the past twenty years leading one to question his veracity as a national symbol. In the latter case, 
Kyrgyzstan willingly parted with their imposing national warrior; Atambayev claimed that 
Manas was in fact an ethnic Russian during his state visit to Moscow.320 Undeterred, Manaschys 
have recently advocate the renaming of Bishkek to Manas.321 
It is also worth noting that the “north-south divide,” and relations between the Bishkek 
and the southern “periphery,” are complex, nuanced, and multifaceted in terms of how they 
contribute to the notion of the Republic as a contested space. As Bond and Koch argue, the 
broader pattern of “north-south,” relations and cycles of inter-ethnic violence are in-fact the 
byproduct of a complex set of highly localized circumstances and experiences.322 These range 
from disparities in economic prosperity, representation, and access to services to the experiences 
of individual communities, such as discrimination by the state. While inter-ethnic strife between 
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks plays a key role in the perception of a “north-south,” divide, this notion is 
reinforced by the inherent regionalism present within the clan and patronage structures which 
dominate the political-geographic landscape of Kyrgyzstan. This regional divide has become 
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more pronounced since independence – particularly with the formation of regionally-aligned 
blocs of clans from the north or south.323  
Finally, as a contested space the republic is subject to geopolitical contest which 
manifests in everything from basing agreements and development aid to foreign funded mosques 
and universities. To be sure, these projects are more interested in furthering geopolitical interests 
than merely currying good favor or assisting Kyrgyzstan; the European Union, United States, 
China, Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf States all pursue their own interests. As with so much of the 
former Soviet near-abroad, Russian motivations in Kyrgyzstan are tied to maintaining a friendly 
buffer in the region as a hedge against other geopolitical actors; the US air base at Manas 
International Airport (closed in 2014) was long a point of contention for the Russians. 
Kyrgyzstan likewise provides Russia with a valuable source of migrant labor. The Chinese share 
similar concerns but are also interested in using the Republic as a corridor to link western China 
to the broader trade networks spanning China, Eurasia, and Europe envisioned under the Belt and 
Road Initiative. Turkish goals in Kyrgyzstan are less clear, however Kyrgyzstan serves as a 
valuable locale for Turkish investment and business activity and also shares similar linguistic 
and cultural traditions to Turkey.324 Uzbekistan’s role in the geopolitics of the region should not 
be understated either, given its status as the most populous and developed country of Central 
Asia. Under the tenure of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan consistently sought to influence events in 
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the region through diplomacy and through force – likewise serving as a conduit through which 
the United States and other superpowers exert military influence in Central Asia and 
Afghanistan.325 As noted, in the context of Kyrgyzstan this involved a militarized border, 
acceptance of ethnically Uzbek refugees fleeing ethnic violence, and military incursions into 
Batken Oblast.326 Finally, as the most open country in the region, the Kyrgyz Republic has 
understandably also attracted the US and EU – who engage in efforts to bolster or promote 
democracy, good governance, civil society, education, religious tolerance, women’s 
empowerment, and public health as well as general economic development. These efforts are 
accompanied by attempts to help build the security capacity of the Republic through border 
controls, policing, and counterterrorism.  
Place, Space, and Capacity 
 Given the focus of this research it is imperative to discuss place and space in the context 
of state capacity in Kyrgyzstan. The post-independence history and nested spaces of the Republic 
underscore an array of challenges faced in terms of capacity. These include aspects of 
performative capacity, as well as aspects of rent extraction, institutions, the role of crime in the 
state, and longstanding challenges to Bishkek’s power in the south.  
 With regard to performative capacity, state efforts remain gilded. The capital provides a 
wellspring of examples which manifest primarily in banal forms. Wandering downtown Bishkek, 
these are strikingly omnipresent. Well-manicured parks are punctuated by monuments to national 
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figures such as Manas and Chingiz Aitmatov.327 While monuments to WWII remain, there are 
newly erected monuments to the conflicts of a new nation, such as the Batken crisis of the mid-
1990s as well as to the martyrs of the second Kyrgyz revolution in 2010.328 Efforts to cultivate 
nationalism in the Republic can and have backfired repeatedly, however.  
 Some efforts of state institutions and elites to emphasize the performative aspects of 
nation serve as a direct threat to state capacity. For example, recent efforts to revoke the official 
status of Russian as a language in Kyrgyzstan have resulted in fears of renewed outmigration by 
ethnic Slavs, as well as long-term difficulties for Kyrgyz seeking work in Russia. These serve as 
key challenges to state capacity in the sense they reduce the ability of the Kyrgyz state to extract 
rents by harming economic productivity with the emigration of high-skill ethnic Slavs. Likewise, 
these efforts may jeopardize a critical source of GDP – remittances from migrant workers in 
Russia – by worsening diplomatic relations with Moscow and reducing the number of workers 
who can work in Russia due to their fluency in Russian.329  
This is to say nothing of the fact that language laws have – in the past – served a key 
grievance of minority groups. Left unaddressed, these grievances have contributed to outbreaks 
of political violence. In this sense, the performative aspects associated with mandating a national 
language can be viewed as undermining state capacity by contributing to the preconditions by 
which internal state sovereignty is challenged. A further spatial aspect of language laws is the 
space from which they originate as well as the space they shape. In Kyrgyzstan these laws are 
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both an input and byproduct of internally contested space. Finally, these laws demonstrate a 
central political power which disregards the concerns of those in the minority – mainly 
communities of ethnic Uzbeks in the south. The marginalization of such communities is only 
likely to further impede the ability of the central government to exert control over the multi-
ethnic south.330 
It is also worth noting that state efforts at public performative capacity through 
monuments, for example, are closely tied to the nature of Kyrgyzstan as a post-Soviet and 
Central Asian space. Efforts by the state to engage in this aspect of capacity can be construed as 
an important aspect of building a new nation-state in the aftermath of Soviet collapse. In the 
different states of the region, this takes different forms. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan both rely on 
national figures – Timur and Manas, respectively – as symbols through which the national ideal 
is represented. In Kazakhstan, this project involved the construction of an entirely new capital 
itself. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are arguably the only two countries of the region where these 
projects have failed to materialize in any significant regard due to ethno-regional cleavages in the 
former and efforts of the leaders of the latter to establish personality cults.331 As a whole, these 
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efforts by the state to publicly demonstrate capacity and demarcate space and nation are an 
important consideration when discussing state capacity in Central Asia. 
These efforts at performative capacity are by no means unique to post-Soviet Central 
Asia, however they do face a challenge in the region in the form of existing Soviet monuments 
and nostalgia. In this sense, elements of contested space are nested within the spaces of post-
Soviet Central Asia. In Kyrgyzstan, this challenge is embodied by remnants of public space 
demarcated by Lenin and a plurality of citizens professing Soviet nostalgia.332 While there are 
other considerations to retaining these statues, they still seemingly challenge state efforts to 
perform nationalism through monument – sometimes to the effect of sardonic satire.333  
The final aspect of space and capacity which requires discussion is the role of crime in 
the state and the integrity of institutions. Both are closely tied to the nested spaces of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Likewise, both are important to understanding capacity or lack thereof in the Republic. 
While a more robust geography of corruption is warranted, in short this thesis operates under the 
framework that penetration of the state by criminal actors and institutional corruption diminish 
state capacity due to rents lost through corruption, a breakdown of ideational capacity, and the 
reinforcement of exclusive and extractive political institutions.334 In Kyrgyzstan these are 
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likewise closely tied to the politics of patronage – a system which itself exhibits important spatial 
dynamics.335  
Regarding how these aspects of capacity are influenced by the space of Kyrgyzstan, there 
are two important considerations tied the spaces of transition, transit, and exchange and 
geopolitical contest within the republic. Foremost, as a space of transition, transit, and exchange 
Kyrgyzstan provides a space wherein corruption can flourish because the spatial infrastructure 
for corruption exists. While large banks have consistently proved willing to launder the proceeds 
from crime, in Kyrgyzstan these operations have been closely linked to the government and 
elected officials.336 This seemingly serves as a tailor-made case of Glassman and Tilly’s 
conceptualizations of regressive capacity – i.e. the state as an institution designed to benefit 
global hyper-capitalism and/or wealthy elites respectively.337 In the case of Kyrgyzstan, 
regressive capacity with regards to graft and corruption more closely mirrors Tilly’s ideation of 
regressive capacity and state-making as organized crime.338 
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Beyond the transit of capital from state coffers, spaces of transition and geopolitical 
contest also contribute to corruption and regressive capacity in the Republic. This is a byproduct 
of several spatial circumstances in Kyrgyzstan which have allowed corruption to persist. Despite 
political transition, Kyrgyzstan has failed to transition from a reliance on subsidies. Prior to 
1991, these were provided by Moscow. After the Soviet collapse, Western foreign donors were 
more than happy to subsidize the only democracy in the region.339 Continued support has 
resulted in an estimated $13 billion US in aid and loans to Kyrgyzstan since independence. For 
reference, Kyrgyz GDP in 2015 was $6.5 billion; official estimates placed annual losses from 
official corruption at $700 million.340 Outside backers remain determined to support Kyrgyzstan 
through loans, aid, and grants, however. There is little doubt that the contested geopolitical space 
of the Republic serves as a key motivator in this willingness on the part of outside backers to 
continue to subsidize the Kyrgyz government. In terms of relation to state capacity, foreign 
assistance without accountability has allowed for continued official corruption and aid fraud in 
the development sector, reducing the effectiveness of aid and contributing to the broader capacity 
issues of ideational and implementational capacity.341 
The typologies of space embodied by the Kyrgyz Republic underscore the challenges 
faced by the republic in cultivating capacity. Each of the nested spaces of the republic presents 
unique challenges – particularly in state efforts to cultivate performative, fiscal, ideational, and 
implementational capacity. Furthermore, a space where corruption persists contributes to the 
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notion of the state as a victim of regressive capacity. In some cases, state efforts to remedy these 
issues have further exacerbated them. In short, state capacity in the Republic is inexorably linked 
to the nested spaces of the republic. It is an input upon how these spaces are shaped and exist and 
is likewise a product of the spaces which it shapes.  
Conclusion: Chapter III 
 This section provided a brief overview of Central Asia as well as a detailed summary of 
the Kyrgyz Republic as a place and space. In doing so, it ties the history, politics, and space of 
the Republic to critical issues of capacity – with a general theme of a struggle to cultivate 
capacity over nearly thirty years of independence. Importantly, it also introduced the notion of 
the republic as an “experimental state,” that is a state which is periodically refiguring its 
institutions and politics. In discussing the findings of field interviews, Chapter V will explore 
these concepts further in the broader context of state and societal responses to narcotics 
trafficking in the republic and the ramifications for state capacity. The next Chapter will 
concisely detail field research, data collection, and treatment before discussing results in the 
following section.  
106 
 
Chapter IV: Research Design and Methodology 
 This section will detail the design and methodology employed during research - 
specifically the collection and analysis of primary source narratives and data. This research relies 
on two chief sources of information. Foremost, it relies on field interviews - which provided key 
insight into the political and criminal landscape of the Kyrgyz Republic. Beyond interviews and 
field observations, this research utilizes publicly accessible data to visually and cartographically 
represent some of these trends - specifically with regards to political sentiment and counter-
narcotics efforts.  
Rationale: Field Interviews 
 The primary source information around which this thesis is structured are a series of field 
interviews conducted in the Kyrgyz Republic during the summer of 2018. The decision to pursue 
field interviews was guided by several considerations. Owing to a firm-footing in human 
geography dating to the inception of this research project, it was deemed imperative that this 
research incorporate a fieldwork component. This component was designed to obtain primary-
source data in the form of narratives. It furthermore was designed to provide the firsthand 
observations necessary for contextualizing the Kyrgyz Republic as a space. Literature review - as 
demonstrated in Chapter II - strongly supports the use of field interviews for conducting this 
manner of research - namely the work of Alexander Kupatadze and Kyle Evered.342 Kupatadze’s 
work especially provided a model which this research sought to emulate.  
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Most importantly, the rationale for conducting field interviews was firmly rooted in prior 
fieldwork conducted by the Department of Geosciences at the University of Arkansas - 
specifically the work of thesis director Ted Holland.343 Specifically, Holland’s work in Kalmykia 
in the North Caucasus provided a framework for designing interviews - including consent 
agreements, prompts, and interview structure.344 Finally, the decision to pursue fieldwork in 
Kyrgyzstan was strongly influenced and encouraged by geographers Alex Diener and Matt 
Derrick, both of whom have previously conducted fieldwork in the Republic and provided input 
during the early stages of planning - and fieldwork itself in Derrick’s case.345   
Research Design and Overview of Fieldwork 
 Research was designed around fieldwork featuring semi-structured interviews utilizing 
eleven prompts, as well as follow-up questions deemed relevant during the course of the 
interview, approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Arkansas (See 
Appendix K).  Fieldwork was conducted in the Kyrgyz Republic between late June and early 
August of 2018 under affiliation with the Central Asian Studies Institute at the American 
University of Central Asia, during which time fifteen interviews were conducted. Interviews 
were conducted in English and Russian, with an interpreter facilitating in the case of the latter. 
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Interviewees came from a variety of backgrounds including international organizations, local 
NGOs, academia, and the national government. Interview questions are as follows: 
1. How would you describe yourself? Do you identify with a particular religion or 
ethnic group?  
2. What do you think influences responses to narcotics trafficking? Do you think 
these influences impact the effectiveness of these responses? How? 
3. Do you see religion as a factor influencing responses to narcotics trafficking? 
Likewise, do you see ethnic affiliation or personal kinship ties playing a role? 
4. Specifically regarding societal responses to narcotics trafficking, do you believe 
religion plays a major role? If so, how and why? 
5. Could you provide the following information: age, educational level, the nature of 
your employment, and general outlook? 
6. Generally speaking, how do you perceive the issue of narcotics trafficking in the 
Kyrgyz Republic?  
7. Are you familiar with some of the government and societal responses to narcotics 
trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic? 
8. What are some of the government and societal responses you've personally 
observed? Are you familiar with other responses?  
9. Do you think political issues in surrounding countries have influenced narcotics 
trafficking? To what degree? 
10. Do you think the transition away from the Soviet Union to an independent 
country has affected narcotics trafficking and responses to trafficking? 
How/Why?  
11. Do you think societal changes which accompanied the transition from the Soviet 
Union to an independent country, such as the revival of Islam, have impacted 
responses to narcotics trafficking, or trafficking itself? How/why?  
 
Regarding interview protocols and procedures, each interviewee was asked to sign a 
consent form prior to the beginning of the interview owing to the sensitive nature of the topic of 
research. They were also asked how they would like to be identified in any research products 
which resulted from fieldwork - i.e. conference papers, planned articles, and this thesis. Several 
interviews went unrecorded at the explicit request of the interviewee, however most interviewees 
consented to having the audio from their interview recorded. All interviewees consented to notes 
being taken during interviews.  
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Following each interview, the interviewee was assigned a UID number by which the 
interview and subsequent summary report are identified. Reports were drafted following each 
interview, and utilize notes, audio, and transcripts to summarize key information provided by 
each interviewee.  
The metadata related to field interviews is relatively straightforward. During the 
fieldwork period, fifteen interviews were conducted with representatives from government, 
diplomatic missions, international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
and academia. Interviews themselves were conducted between June 28th and July 30th - 
occurring at regular intervals between one and five days apart depending on scheduling 
availability and travel logistics.  Of the fifteen interviews conducted, eleven were conducted in 
English and four were conducted in Russian. Of the interviews conducted in Russian, one was 
conducted with an interpreter - Mrs. Ainura Sulaimanova - present. The three additional 
interviews conducted in Russian were conducted independently and recorded. Sulaimanova 
produced transcripts of these interviews based on the recordings. Regarding geographic 
distribution, eleven of the fifteen interviews were conducted in Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek. 
These interviews were conducted in English - with one exception. Three interviews - all in 
Russian - were conducted outside of Bishkek, all with locally based NGOs. One of these was 
conducted in Karakol in the eastern part of the country, while the other two were conducted in 
Osh in the south. Of the individuals interviewed, five work for IGOs. Another five respondents 
direct NGOs; four of these are locally based whereas one is the local office of an international 
NGO. Of the remaining respondents, two work for a diplomatic mission, two are professional 
academics, and one works for the national government. 
At least a dozen interview requests went unanswered, were delayed, or were outright 
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refused - including requests submitted to the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The latter requests were bureaucratically ping-ponged from initial submission to 
the conclusion of fieldwork. Despite setbacks, interviews provided valuable insight into the topic 
at hand, as well as some quantitative data pertaining to drug trafficking, governance statistics, 
and public attitudes towards government. This included providing direction to publicly available 
data through Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistics Committee (stat.kg), as well as a catalogue of 
stamps utilized by heroin producers and traffickers to mark their product – aggregated at a 
country scale.346 Fieldwork also yielded a series of firsthand observations - complete with 
photographic documentation - related to space, crime, trafficking, and state capacity; these will 
be further discussed in Chapter IV In short, these observations included drug-related graffiti as 
well as a number of crypto-currency exchange facilities, luxury vehicles, and high-end real-estate 
developments. While not explicitly tied to narcotics trafficking, several interviewees pointed to 
these as evidence of broader issues of public confidence in government, corruption, and money 
laundering. Critically, fieldwork provided the context for defining Kyrgyzstan as a place and 
space. This is crucial given this research originates in Geography and assumes that narcotics 
trafficking and subsequent responses are spatial processes. 
Rationale: Cartographic Representation 
 This research is rooted in Geography. As such, it seeks to demonstrate the spatial and 
temporal aspect of trends and data encountered during research. These trends innately tied to the 
political geography of Kyrgyzstan. The representations in this thesis thus rely on cartographic 
training received over the past year in order to visually represent areal data in several 
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capacities.347 They primarily seek to represent single-variable areal data through use of 
choroplethy. In this case, choroplethy was selected to demonstrate spatial patterns based on 
intensity of color – with darker colors indicating higher rates of seizures.  
Overview of Data Collection and Review of Data Collected 
 In addition to field interviews, this research makes use of publicly available data provided 
through several organizations in order to cartographically represent key aspects of public 
attitudes, state capacity, governance, and narcotics trafficking. The three primary sources 
through which data was obtained were the UNODC, the National Statistics Committee of the 
Kyrgyz Republic (stat.kg), and the Central Asia Barometer. Stat.kg and the UNODC both 
provided seizure statistics for Central Asia up until 2015 and 2016, respectively. As previously 
noted, this data is used as an approximation based on longstanding issues regarding the validity 
of state-reported seizure statistics. From both sources, research sought to collect drug seizure 
totals measured in kilograms for as many years possible. During the fall of 2018 this data was 
collected for Central Asia and Transcaucasia from 2005-2015 - the years for which most 
countries in the region possess reliable data. Data for additional years - from the mid-1990s and 
2016 was collected during the spring of 2019. For this survey period, the twenty years between 
1996 and 2016 provide the most complete dataset for the region. For Kyrgyzstan specifically, in 
addition to country-scale UNODC data stat.kg provided seizure statistics dating from dating 
from 2010 until 2014.  Both collection efforts specifically targeted heroin and raw and/or 
processed opium. These efforts did not assess reported seizures of other opiates or opiate-related 
precursors such as illicit morphine, prescription opiates, poppy plants, poppy straw, or precursor 
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chemicals. They likewise did not assess seizures of NPS, cannabis, or cocaine - considering that 
the focus of this research is trafficking of opiates.   
While stat.kg provides some measures of governance, upon initial assessment they 
proved unclear in terms of what indicators were being assessed, and furthermore how they were 
being assessed. They were equally vague in terms of methodology. As such, governance 
statistics provided by stat.kg were eschewed in favor of several large-n surveys conducted across 
Kyrgyzstan in 2013, 2014, and 2015 by the Central Asia Barometer. These surveys provide 
useful information regarding public views on everything from institutional credibility to 
geopolitics, religion, and national direction. Each survey assessed different series of questions, 
grouping respondents based on region, age, and gender. The total number of participants (n) was 
1000 in the 2013 survey, 800 in the 2014 survey, and 1906 in the 2015 survey. 
Data Treatment 
 The primary data treatment involved with this research was ensuring that quantitative 
data was suitable for accurate cartographic representation. These treatments primarily involved 
normalizing country-level and oblast-level areal data pertaining to narcotics seizures and crimes. 
In the case of seizure data obtained through UNODC and stat.kg, reported seizures in kilograms 
were normalized by population - specifically per 100,000 inhabitants. These normalizations were 
constructed utilizing historical population data respective to the year represented by each map. 
These normalization techniques were utilized based on their common usage in geographical and 
statistical analyses of crime. Data from Central Asia Barometer was obtained pre-normalized. In 
addition to providing a total n for each survey, survey data indicated the number of respondents 
based on oblast, age, and sex/gender. Responses are measured in percentages along these lines. 
For the purposes of this research, analysis and representation focused on oblast-level (provincial-
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level) responses. Following normalization and data-tidying, it was possible to generate a series of 
tables and maps utilizing represent the trends in narcotics seizures and political attitudes in the 
Kyrgyz Republic. 
Conclusion: Research Design and Methodology 
 This section detailed the design and methodology employed during research - specifically 
the collection and analysis of primary source narratives and data. These data sources both 
provide valuable insight into the issue of narcotics trafficking and state capacity in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, even if they are admittedly limited in scope. As will be discussed in the next chapter, 
fieldwork provided unique insight into issues of trafficking and capacity - both through 
interviews and through direct observation. It likewise served as the basis for understanding the 
key limitations and assumptions of this research. The open data utilized for this thesis also 
provides key insight and context into the trends being studied. Similarly, it allows for the spatial 
and temporal situation of these trends through cartographic representation - key considering this 
thesis is rooted in political geography and argues the inherently spatial nature of the trends being 
studied.  
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Chapter V: Findings 
 This section will discuss the findings of research conducted over the past two years. 
Specifically, it will detail key information which was conveyed during field interviews 
conducted in the Kyrgyz Republic during the summer of 2018. Likewise, it will detail spatial and 
temporal trends observed in publicly reported and available data provided by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime as well as the Kyrgyz government through their public data portal, 
stat.kg. Finally, this section will include a discussion of this information as it relates to one 
another as well as the broader issue of state capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Trends in Trafficking 
Since obtaining independence in the early 1990s, the Central Asian republics have long 
struggled to combat narcotics trafficking originating in Afghanistan. The problem has persisted 
to the present day but received considerable attention in the early 2000s following the US 
invasion of Afghanistan and concerns over terrorist finance tied to the narcotics trade. The 
concern among the United States and other Western countries was that insurgents and terrorist 
groups operating in the region were drawing significant funding from the narcotics trade – which 
may in-turn be utilized to finance international terrorism or at a minimum destabilize the fragile 
regimes of the region. In Central Asia, groups such as the Taliban and the IMU represented a 
particular concern, considering both groups deep involvement in the heroin trade.348 These 
concerns have continued to guide policy discourse and academic scholarship on the issue, 
however interviews and in-depth research elucidate a more nuanced picture of trafficking in the 
region, particularly Kyrgyzstan. 
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As noted in scholarship and during interviews, for example, organized crime syndicates 
play a significantly larger role in trafficking than militant organizations. These include 
Kyrgyzstan chapters of the infamous vory v zakone, or “thieves-in-law” – a criminal syndicate 
rooted in the Stalin-era gulags with branches throughout the former Soviet Union. At a local 
level, groups organized along the basis of ethnicity also play a significant role in trafficking 
within Kyrgyzstan – including groups comprised of ethnic Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Azeris, 
Chechens, and Russians. More so than these ethnic mafias, corrupt police and government 
officials are believed to be responsible for a lion’s share of trafficking – both internal and 
transnational – within the Republic.349 One interviewee also alleged that Chinese organized 
crime is making inroads in Kyrgyzstan.350 
 The other key development to emerge from interviews which challenged existing 
scholarship is the nature of what is being trafficked to and through Kyrgyzstan. Historically, 
Kyrgyzstan has been subject to high rates of opiate trafficking due to its proximity to 
Afghanistan and its situation along a major drug trafficking corridor. Bishkek and Osh represent 
major hubs of this activity. Those interviewed noted increasing concern over trafficking in 
synthetic narcotics, particularly those produced in or destined for local markets.351   
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Designated “NPS,” by policymakers and authorities, these included locally produced or imported 
amphetamines , club drugs, hallucinogens, and synthetic cannabinoids (e.g. “K2”).352 Field 
observations were able to verify some aspects of this burgeoning trade, particularly through 
documentation of graffiti tags advertising various types of synthetics for sale via encrypted 
messaging services and dark-web marketplaces. Several of these “advertisements,” could be 
interpreted as targeting tourists based on the language in which they appeared as well as their 
location – in one case in near a tourist hostel (See Appendix L). Of less concern is internal 
trafficking of cannabis, which grows wildly throughout the country and is often harvested and 
processed into hashish resin by the rural poor.353 
The Spatial Nature of Trafficking and Responses 
Trafficking and subsequent responses are fundamentally spatial processes. They are 
processes that occur in space but also which shape space. Trafficking involves the transfer of a 
commodity and capital across space, however this transfer also shapes space and contributes to 
the spatial condition of the Kyrgyz Republic as an experimental state. It is an act which elicits 
corruption, influences the political landscape, and challenges internal sovereignty and state 
capacity. Trafficking in Kyrgyzstan also seeks to maintain a status quo - neither anarchy nor state 
competence.  
Responses ostensibly seek to counter these challenges by themselves seeking to control 
space. Checkpoints, border guards, anti-corruption drives, and a significant presence of 
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international organizations and foreign actors all represent spatial manifestations of a desire to 
combat trafficking. In some ways by attempting to control space these measures counteract their 
goal. Checkpoints present further opportunities for police harassment, bribery, and corruption, 
from everyday citizens to traffickers moving product.354 Graft in foreign aid tied to these efforts  
is a widely recognized but little acknowledged problem.355 Even then, the sheer amount of aid 
available in the Republic precludes any substantive change - if one donor balks there are many 
others willing to accommodate. Responses are also concentrated in the north and dismissive of 
the south. A recurring complaint among officials familiar with the issue is the unwillingness of 
government agencies responsible for policing trafficking to establish headquarters or even larger 
branches in south Kyrgyzstan, where the problem is viewed as more acute.356 This reinforces the 
notion among southerners of the south as a periphery – ensuring that enforcement efforts in the 
region are more difficult. One interviewee even referred to the south as “semi-autonomous,” 
while others noted government ineffectiveness across the south, even alleging that organized 
crime syndicates played a larger role in maintaining peace in the south between ethnic groups 
than the government.357  
This is not to say responses are wholly negative. As later noted, Kyrgyzstan is considered 
one of the most progressive countries in the region. This contributes to the conception that it is a 
space unique from its neighbors - a more liberal social and political regime. While trafficking has 
                                                 
354 Anonymous US Official, Interview with Anonymous US Official, interview by Christopher Cowan, In-Person, 
July 20, 2018. 
355 Anonymous US Official. 
356 Anonymous UN Official, Interview - Anonymous UN Official; Anonymous US Official, Interview - Anonymous 
US Official. 
357 Anonymous US Official, Interview - Anonymous US Official; Anonymous UN Official, Interview - Anonymous 
UN Official; Dzhuraev, Interview - Dzhuraev. 
118 
 
rendered the Republic a contested space, subsequent responses contribute to the concept of it 
being an experimental state. This comes with benefits and drawbacks, but the harm reduction 
measures in the Kyrgyz Republic are arguably better than the alternatives in surrounding 
countries.  
State and Societal Responses to Narcotics Trafficking 
The ultimate thrust of this fieldwork was to determine what influences state and societal 
responses to narcotics trafficking in Kyrgyzstan. Prior to fieldwork, there was a strong 
assumption that ethnic identity would be presented as a major aspect of trafficking and 
responses. Fieldwork and continued research indicate that regionalism and kinship ties outstrip 
ethnic identity in terms of importance to trafficking. Still, there remain distinct spatial and 
geographic elements to drug trafficking and responses, ranging from Kyrgyzstan’s location to 
internal political geography.  
Regarding positive responses to trafficking, interviewees were quick to cite the Kyrgyz 
Republic as one of the most progressive countries in the region in terms of local harm reduction 
and demand reduction.358 Harm reduction programs are primarily designed to diminish harm 
associated with narcotics use – but not to reduce narcotics use itself.359 Examples of harm 
reduction involve measures such as distributing prophylactics and clean needles to registered 
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drug users as well as providing drug users with legal assistance and personal support.360 By 
contrast, demand reduction is designed to reduce the overall demand and use of narcotics in 
society.361 Demand reduction efforts in the Republic encompass everything from establishing 
detox centers in prisons to methadone clinics and youth education programs.362 Both efforts are 
heavily supported by international funding and partnerships.  
Many interviews proved candid in discussing the challenges to responses to trafficking. 
Widespread government corruption was universally cited and was a common theme between all 
interviews. This corruption - embodied by patronage, misuse of funds, and preferential treatment 
of elites - engenders widespread cynicism and undermines government credibility. Another 
common theme in most interviews was the lax attitude that permeates official policy regarding 
trafficking, what one interview described as a problem viewed with “little sense of urgency.”363 
Because of low salaries, widespread corruption, and structural instability within law enforcement 
and state bureaucracy, many of those interviewed noted the low incentive to police narcotics 
flows.364 Structural instability, in this case, is embodied by regular restructuring of institutions 
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and high rates of employee turnover - both of which contribute to the notion of an experimental 
state. 
Officials provided several examples of this. One interviewee expressed frustration with 
international efforts to train police and government agencies to utilize specialized equipment or 
software, only to have trainees transfer to different agencies or private-sector jobs following the 
training. This undermines purpose of such programs.365 Some international officials were also 
critical of the restructuring of the State Service for Drug Control (SSDC). This was viewed as 
diminishing the independence and operational effectiveness of the agency. The alleged benefit of 
this restructuring is that because SSDC budgets were previously subsidized by foreign aid, they 
had grown difficult to independently sustain. Placing the agency under the jurisdiction of the 
MoIA ensures that it will continue to receive funding.366 In a final example, interviewees lauded 
a program that utilized foreign aid budgets to subsidize police salaries an effective anathema to 
corruption.367 It was in-fact judged as one of the most effective programs against low-level 
police corruption implemented in Kyrgyzstan. Despite this, it was eventually shuttered. While 
there are legitimate questions over the long-term sustainability of the program, frustration over 
counteracting an effective program was apparent. 
Effectiveness of individual programs aside, interviewees also noted an attitude of realism 
on the part of the Kyrgyz government. This attitude is encompassed by the sentiment that due to 
a low-level of violence associated with drug trafficking in Kyrgyzstan, and the fact that it will 
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happen regardless, it doesn’t benefit the Kyrgyz government to bear the brunt of a supply-
focused campaign against opiate trafficking. This was alternatively construed as the Kyrgyz 
government being unwilling to accept increased levels of violence associated with a campaign to 
combat narcotics trafficking on behalf of high-demand countries that engage in comparatively 
few demand and harm reduction measures.368 There is potentially an element of corruption at 
play as well; as long as narcotics trafficking remains a security issue in Central Asia, the state 
will be eligible for counter-narcotics and security assistance packages associated with the War on 
Drugs, which presents an opportunity for further official corruption. In short, it behooves the 
corrupt elites of the Kyrgyz state to maintain the status quo. 
Finally, policing methods themselves are viewed as an issue. Foremost is the deference to 
Soviet methods, which emphasize control of physical space - through checkpoints and border 
guards - over good police work. Many experts assert that intelligence-led policing is a far 
preferable strategy; there is little will for it.369 The tendency to request aid in the form of 
equipment was also cited as a major source of frustration among international agencies, many of 
whom argued that good police work does not require high-end 4x4s or new computers.370  
In a repudiation of the historically dominant narrative, several interviewees noted that 
there remains little to suggest that narcotics trafficking within the Kyrgyz Republic is directly 
tied to terrorist finance.371 While this may have been the case when the IMU was active, most 
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“green trafficking,” - trafficking tied to Islamists - is local distribution.372 One interviewee even 
noted - half jokingly - that some more pious Muslim drug dealers stop dealing during Ramadan 
and resume after Eid al-Fitr.373 Still, most trafficking and in-country distribution is controlled by 
corrupt officials and local mafias based on kinship ties or ethnic affiliation. Despite insufficient 
evidence to substantively tie narcotics trafficking in the Republic to militant Islamist groups and 
other violent non-state actors, it remains a concern for foreign officials - particularly those 
distributing foreign aid. In terms of responses, there is a general sense that the Islamic revival in 
the period following the Soviet Union has - in fact - served as a deterrent against local narcotics 
use, especially in the south.374  
Beyond corruption and lacking political will, there are significant stigmas against drug 
use in Kyrgyzstan when it comes to hard drugs including opiates and synthetics - so much so that 
several NGOs described facing criticism for working with drug addicts.375 These stigmas are 
extremely strong in the south - described ostensibly as a result of stronger religious influences.376  
One interviewee provided an anecdote detailing how drug users sent to prison in the south were 
sometimes “beaten clean,” by other prisoners under the guise of religion.377 Beyond public 
scrutiny, other interviewees noted that NGOs and Civil Society Organizations have broadly 
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faced increased government scrutiny in the region. Some interviewees whose organizations work 
on drug issues or issues surrounding corruption, human rights, and peacebuilding described 
direct personal harassment by government officials.378  
Finally, there are two temporal narratives which deserve attention. Foremost is the 
evolving landscaping of trafficking and responses in the post-Soviet era. In the immediate 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia was subject to a mass-influx of opiates from war-torn 
Afghanistan. Drugs were cheap and widely available - a running joke among police was that a 
gram of heroin was as cheap as a bottle of good import beer.379 Things have improved since the 
heyday of narcotics trafficking in the early 1990s, but they have also evolved. While opiates 
remain a concern, officials are increasingly worried about the growing trade in NPS produced 
locally and trafficked from neighboring China.380 Fieldwork uncovered direct evidence of this 
development (See Appendix L). 
The other key temporal narrative is that of that of the post-Soviet. The post-Soviet 
dimension of contested space also has a temporal dimension. Some things have gone unchanged 
over 27 years, from policing strategies to Soviet monuments. There furthermore remains a 
nostalgia for the Soviet Union - things “worked,” back then. Trafficking was by no means 
nonexistent, but merely unacknowledged - a problem of bourgeoise Western states.381 Policing 
under the Soviet Union was also viewed by many as more competent; police were viewed as 
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better compensated and more professional.382 Likewise, police budgets and structure were not 
subject to significant fluctuations resultant from political transitions and upheaval. These 
temporal narratives are posited alongside a reality which an equal number of people 
acknowledge - that of the shift from Soviet satellite to experimental state which has seen 
continuing struggles of governance and development – likely to the benefit of the narcotics trade. 
Even with such issues, in the overall context of the region Kyrgyzstan is seen in much 
better terms than neighboring countries. Uzbekistan’s crackdown on narcotics trafficking has 
been described as draconian, ineffective, and a pretext for repression and targeting of political 
opposition.383 A significant portion of Tajikistan’s GDP - estimated at between 30% and 50% - is 
tied to the narcotics trade.384 The harm reduction strategy in Kyrgyzstan is seen as comparatively 
progressive as well; it is the only country in the region investing in substantive resources for 
recovering drug users - ranging from clean zones in prisons to methadone clinics and public 
health campaigns. These efforts are widely praised by the international community, who has 
invested heavily in them.  
Competing Narratives 
The breadth of qualitative data gathered during fieldwork is illuminative in its scope, 
however it elucidates the competing narratives surrounding this issue. Such narratives are 
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doubtless influenced by a range of factors including individual perceptions, personal 
experiences, and even geographic location. Furthermore, information from several interviews 
directly contradicted information from other interviews, or even information that is publicly 
available. One such case involved disagreements officially reported numbers of registered drug 
users as compared to estimates by individuals being interviewed.385 There was likewise a 
palpable cynicism in many of the interviews, with some interviewees expressing strong 
disagreements with the policies and positions of others. Some local NGOs and foreign officials 
noted their skepticism to the efficacy of international efforts coordinated by large IGOs, for 
example. The sense among some is that the funding available through these organizations 
combined with a lack of accountability contributes to larger issues of graft, corruption, and aid 
fraud in the Republic. Another complaint is that some IGOs are all mouth and no trousers – they 
contribute nominally to policy discourse but do little in the way of facilitating policy 
implementation. One interviewee even alleged that some NGOs are established for the sole 
purpose of aid fraud, with little intention to implement projects for which they receive grants. 
This was described as “grant eating.”386 
Situating competing narratives in a quantitative context proves even more difficult. Many 
interviewees urged skepticism of publicly available data and statistics related to narcotics 
trafficking in the Kyrgyzstan. This extends to data and statistics provided by the Kyrgyzstan’s 
government. Depending on the interviewee, official estimates were either exaggerated or 
conservative to the point of being misleading. Several interviewees couched their skepticism of 
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seizure data in terms of police corruption - “skimming,” captured product for resale on local 
markets, for example. Interviewees likewise noted that official numbers of drug users across the 
country are either over-estimated/reported or vice versa; considering that drug users are self-
registered this information is difficult to verify. The UNODC estimated three times as many 
active drug users as publicly reported – likely because drug users are self-registered and often 
avoid registration to avoid police harassment.387 Most importantly, there is also a widespread 
belief that seizure statistics represent a mere fraction of what actually passes through Kyrgyzstan. 
It is with this skepticism in mind that data was examined.  
Spatial and Temporal Trends from Data 
As noted in Chapter IV, this research relies on three primary sources of data. Foremost 
are narcotics seizure statistics provided by the UNODC – which are viewed as an approximation 
of what is passing through the Republic. While reporting dates to the early 1990s, reporting of 
opium and heroin seizures for the region does not become consistent until 1996. In the twenty-
year period for which data was available, Kyrgyzstan seized an average yearly total of 573 
kilograms of opium and heroin per year. By contrast, the regional average was 1,495 kilograms 
of opium and heroin seized. Of the five republics, Tajikistan’s twenty-year average of 3,399 
kilograms seized stands out as the highest – more than 2,000 kilograms more than Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan which respectively seized an average of 1,381 kilograms and 1,476 kilograms 
per year. Interestingly, Kazakhstan reported the second lowest average for the twenty-year period 
assessed, seizing an average of 744 kilograms of opium and heroin per year. UNODC reporting 
also includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia in this region, however reporting for these 
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countries – particularly Armenia – remains too sporadic to utilize them as a point of 
comparison.388  
Examining these seizures temporally also proves valuable. For example, Tajikistan’s total 
seizures dropped by almost 2,000 kilograms following the end of the civil war in 1997, only to 
increase to over 6,600 kilograms in 2000 and 7,900 kilograms in 2001. By contrast, all other 
countries in the region experienced a net drop in seizures between 2000 and 2001 – Kyrgyzstan’s 
drop being over 1,000 kilograms. Fluctuations in Kyrgyzstan’s seizure numbers likewise appear 
to be correlated with fluctuations in Kyrgyzstan’s internal politics. While there were minor 
increases in seizures following the 2005 Tulip Revolution, the years between 2006 and 2010 
demonstrate significant fluctuation, dropping by over 500 kilograms between 2009 and 2010 – 
when the Bakiev regime shuttered the state drug control service due to their alleged involvement 
in trafficking. Numbers have since fluctuated but have not returned to the high rates of seizures 
observed in 2000, 2007, and 2009.389  
Beyond these numbers, stat.kg reported select data on narcotics trafficking and related 
offenses for several years – the most complete being 2011 and 2014. For both years, stat.kg 
published data detailing various aspects of drug-related crime in the Republic, including total 
numbers of drug-seizures on a regional level, the nature of drug-related crimes, and national 
seizure statistics by drug type. Regional-scale data for all categories of drug seizures is displayed 
in Appendix M.390 These representations excluded Bishkek and Osh administrative areas – 
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Kyrgyzstan’s most populous cities – which both saw high rates of seizures. Seizure data was 
normalized per 100,000 people as is convention with crime statistics. The result of this analysis 
indicates that Chui Oblast – excluding Bishkek – experienced the highest rates of seizures for 
both years assessed, while Naryn experienced the lowest rates of seizures. Over this three-year 
period, seizure rates dropped in Talas and Issyk-Kul in north Kyrgyzstan but increased in across 
south Kyrgyzstan.391 
This temporal shift can be interpreted as coinciding with a return to normalcy following 
the Second Kyrgyz Revolution. During this period the Bishkek government engaged in efforts to 
counter the influence of southern populist politicians – who were viewed to a threat to central 
governance. In this sense, the increasing seizures across south Kyrgyzstan could be interpreted as 
indicating the increasing capacity of the central government to manage borders and territory in 
the south. The idea that government authority and legitimacy has increased in the south is also 
supported in some sense by election returns from the 2017 presidential election, when 
Atambayev’s hand-appointed successor Jeenbekov carried a majority of voting districts across 
the region.392 While there are likely more complex dynamics contributing to the situation as well, 
these patterns can be interpreted in one sense as demonstrating increased capacity of the central 
government in Kyrgyzstan’s southern periphery. Detracting from this are the views presented in 
some interviews that the south remains semi-autonomous, and that the prevailing peace between 
ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks is both latent and the result of efforts by criminal syndicates.393 
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Analysis and Discussion: Narratives, Spatial Trends, and State Capacity 
 One of the key questions associated with this research is determining how spatial trends 
in trafficking and narratives presented during fieldwork can be interpreted in order to intimate a 
broader picture of state capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic. Likewise, this research is interested 
with how capacity is tied to issues of identity in a state where kinship, patronage, and ethnic 
affiliation play a key role in politics from the local to national scales.  
 As demonstrated in Chapter III, the place, space, and history of Kyrgyzstan is intimately 
tied to the capacity of the Kyrgyz state. This relationship is pronounced within state and societal 
responses to the narcotics trade. In terms of physical geography and state capacity, the 
challenging peaks of the Tian Shan Mountains serve to divide the country – resulting in center-
periphery disconnects as well as issues related to state fiscal capacity.394 They likewise serve as 
an impediment to the state exerting itself over the periphery, a key challenge to implementational 
capacity in outlying areas.395 In the case of performative capacity, the periphery is alternatively 
disregarded by Bishkek or poses a challenge to its authority.396 With regard to the narcotics 
trade, narratives and data indicate that responses to drug trafficking in south Kyrgyzstan suffer 
considerably as a result. Osh and Osh Oblast a major transit point for traffic transiting the 
Republic, but often reports lower seizures than Bishkek and Chui Oblast. There are other 
potential explanations for this, but the fact that state resources are centralized around Bishkek 
may play a role. 
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 Beyond the performative, ideational, and implementational capacity of north-south 
relations, the north-south disconnect serves as a reminder that the Kyrgyz government has 
historically struggled to maintain a Weberian monopoly on violence in the south. While the 1990 
Osh riots were halted by Soviet Interior Ministry troops, the bumbling responses to the Batken 
Crisis and the 2010 Osh riots evidence this.397 Worse, the allegations among some of those 
interviewed allege that organized crime syndicates serve as a key challenger to state power in the 
south and continue to play an important role in the politics of the periphery.398 This challenge is 
not one in the traditional sense of armed clashes between the state and a non-state actor or 
insurgent force. Rather, these organizations engage in a number of licit and illicit activities that 
serve to coopt the authority of the state in the region. This includes drug trafficking, but also 
includes engaging in local and regional politics – such as ensuring peace between ethnic groups 
following the 2010 violence. Some groups possess paramilitary wings, and in the past state elites 
have used these syndicates and/or paramilitaries to accomplish state-parallel objectives such as 
countering the power of other non-state actors viewed as a threat to the state or reclaiming 
government buildings following civil unrest.399 In terms of capacity, the presence of these 
powerful local actors ensures continued struggles for the Kyrgyz state in terms of maintaining 
the monopoly on control of territory viewed by so many as a critical facet of state capacity. In 
this sense, there is a  
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More important to the relationship between space, trafficking, and capacity in the Kyrgyz 
Republic is the fact that the Republic exhibits nested spaces of contest and transition. As noted in 
Chapter III, the foreign aid flows associated with both spaces have proved a significant 
contributor to regressive capacity within the Republic.400 The fact that the republic is a space of 
transit for illicit goods merely compounds this problem, as trafficking provides another means by 
which corrupt elites can extract revenue to benefit themselves and their patronal networks.401 
Kinship and patronage networks play a key role in this extraction as they often serve as a money 
laundering network not directly tied to the elite.402 Given the existing criminal penetration of the 
state, this behavior further serves to diminish state capacity by reducing fidelity in the state on 
behalf of citizens to the detriment of ideational, implementational, and performative aspects of 
state capacity.403 The issue of the windfall effects of regressive capacity is compounded when 
state agents and resources allocated to combat the narcotics trade are themselves implicated in 
trafficking – as alleged by interviewees and literature.404 
 Granted, international funding plays a key role in subsidizing the regressive capacity of 
the Kyrgyz state. This is especially true with regards to counter-narcotics and other securitization 
efforts - such as counterterrorism. Elites in the Kyrgyz government take advantage of threats 
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perceived by outside donors, such as terrorism and political instability, while doing little to 
address some of the underlying causes of this behavior, such as prosecuting elite corruption, 
working to counteract patronal politics, or addressing the grievances of citizens. The effects in 
terms of regressive capacity are as much a result of Kyrgyz elites as they are the donors who 
continue to subsidize their behavior.  
Corruption in counter-narcotics efforts is not isolated, however. Instead, it is part of a 
larger pattern of general corruption within the development sector contributes significantly to the 
regressive capacity observed in the Republic. To reiterate the takeaway from one interview in 
particular – aid fraud is a widespread but little acknowledged problem.405 Aside from 
manifesting in terms of regressive capacity, such corruption in the aid sector in-effect diminishes 
the fiscal capacity of the Kyrgyz state. If foreign aid is indeed a critical aspect of fiscal capacity 
in the Republic, losing hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars each year to graft is 
doubtless a detriment to this fiscal capacity.406 It likewise diminishes implementational capacity 
via patronage; mid-level civil service positions and political appointeeships are often viewed as 
money-making ventures. This contributes to bureaucratic corruption at the expense of merit and 
expertise.407 
Beyond issues of state capacity, this research supports the conclusions of some other 
work conducted on narcotics trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic. Most importantly, it supports 
                                                 
405 Anonymous US Official, Interview - Anonymous US Official. 
406 Bessenov, Interview - Bessenov; Satke, “Downside of Foreign Aid.” 
407 Dzhuraev, Interview - Dzhuraev; Johan Engvall, The State as Investment Market: Kyrgyzstan in Comparative 
Perspective (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016); Johan Engvall, “The State as Investment Market: A Framework 
for Interpreting the Post-S Oviet State in E Urasia,” Governance 28, no. 1 (2015): 25–40; Johan Engvall, “Why Are 
Public Offices Sold in Kyrgyzstan?,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 1 (2014): 67–85. 
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the view that the nature of trafficking in Central Asia broadly and the Kyrgyz Republic 
specifically is nuanced and multifaceted.408 It likewise challenges discourse which posit the 
states of the region are “narco-states,” despite significant state criminality and deeply-rooted 
corruption.409 Likewise, there is little evidence supporting a broad insurgent-criminal nexus or 
spectrum in Kyrgyzstan. Foreign-based militants such as largely defunct IMU play a 
significantly smaller role in trafficking than may have been true historically. Instead, trafficking 
is predominately affiliated with local mafias and criminal gangs as well as the state itself, as it is 
in neighboring Tajikistan.410 While there are doubtless ties between militant groups and illicit 
activities, with regards to the threat crime poses to state capacity, the most pressing concern 
remains state involvement in criminality.  
Finally, in terms of the role of identity, religion, kinship, and patronage in trafficking and 
responses, there are several key takeaways. Foremost, many ethnically affiliated organized crime 
syndicates remain active participants in narcotics trafficking alongside corrupt state officials. In 
terms of responses, while some interviewees disputed the notion of state targeting of certain 
ethnic groups with regard to narcotics policing, others refuted this notion. This competing 
narrative is tempered by longstanding histories of ethnic strife in the Republic with acute spatial 
dimensions. Law enforcement and judicial institutions dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz have 
historically targeted ethnic Uzbeks, especially in the south. The current degree of discriminatory 
policing with regards to narcotics trafficking remains unclear from interviews and literature 
                                                 
408 Kupatadze, “Kyrgyzstan – A Virtual Narco-State?” 
409 Chouvy, “The Myth of the Narco-State.” 
410 Johan Engvall, “The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organised Crime in Tajikistan,” Europe-Asia 
Studies 58, no. 6 (2006): 827–854; Kupatadze, “Political Corruption in Eurasia”; Kupatadze, “Kyrgyzstan – A 
Virtual Narco-State?” 
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review. By contrast, there appear to be few religious dimensions to trafficking beyond religion as 
a specific marker of identity among crime syndicates. As noted, trafficking associated with 
militant Islamists remains difficult to unearth. Arguably, kinship and patronage networks play 
the single most significant role in trafficking and responses, as well as broader issues of crime 
and corruption in general. Interviews consistently reiterated broader issues with corruption, and 
in Kyrgyzstan as with many other countries, corruption has a certain element of wasta.  
Conclusion: Chapter V 
 This section details the key findings of research conducted over the past two years, 
including the findings of field interviews as well as assessments of publicly available data 
regarded to narcotics trafficking. Importantly, this research challenges several longstanding 
tropes regarding the Central Asian narcotics trade. Likewise, it supports the conclusions of other 
research conducted in the social sciences on narcotics trafficking, crime, and capacity in 
Kyrgyzstan. It concludes that while narcotics trafficking is a key challenge to state capacity in 
Kyrgyzstan, there are other more significant challenges including broader state criminality, 
challenging physical geography, patronage politics, and political and institutional 
experimentation. With regards to how these processes manifest spatially, state capacity in the 
Republic displays distinct aspects of center-periphery relations common in many countries which 
face challenges of state capacity.  
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 This research has sought to explore the effects of narcotics trafficking on the political 
geography of the Kyrgyz Republic, with a specific interest in the role of kinship, ethnicity, 
patronage, and religious affiliation as they pertain to narcotics trafficking and subsequent 
responses. This section will provide a brief review of the findings of this research, followed by 
the suggestion of several future areas of inquiry as well as key considerations for conducting 
future research.  
Summary of Research Findings 
 In short, this research draws several key conclusions with regard to narcotics trafficking, 
state and societal responses, space, and state capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic. With regards to 
trafficking, many discourses have historically been rooted in trafficking as a larger threat to 
regional stability and the stability of individual republics in the region due to ties between 
traffickers and militant groups. While some of these discourses indicate the issues associated 
with trafficking and state-stability in terms of corruption, only relatively recently has work 
emerged which presents a more nuanced view of trafficking in the region that disputes the 
predominant narrative of an insurgent-criminal nexus. This thesis supports such scholarship; it 
presents the view that trafficking in Central Asia broadly and Kyrgyzstan specifically is a 
nuanced, multifaceted spatial process with a number of inputs and actors ranging from organized 
crime syndicates to corrupt law enforcement and state elites. In this regard, while trafficking has 
historically been viewed as a state-stability concern in terms of a source of revenue for militants, 
there are other more significant threats to state capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic. Namely, broader 
issues with patronal state-criminality present a more significant threat to capacity than trafficking 
alone. 
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 Like trafficking itself, state and societal responses to narcotics trafficking prove equally 
diverse in their aims and effectiveness. Some means of response actively contribute to corruption 
and broader issues of regressive capacity within the Republic. Discussions of such responses 
likewise indicated a significant albeit underacknowledged level of graft within the aid and 
development sector within Kyrgyzstan. On a positive note, many of those interviewed indicated 
that broader societal responses to trafficking in the republic are positive and preferable to 
responses in surrounding countries.  
 In considering the role of ethnicity, religion, kinship, and patronage in these responses, 
kinship and patronage predominate the discussion. Kinship and patronage are key dimensions 
along which trafficking, corruption, and state crime are prosecuted. Religion was not viewed as a 
significant aspect of trafficking – reinforcing the notion that trafficking by militant Islamists 
remains scant. By contrast, religious revival following the end of the Soviet Union was construed 
in interviews as a net-benefit to addressing issues of drug use and addiction, particularly among 
youths in the South. The role of ethnicity in these processes remains more difficult to discern. 
While some crime syndicates tend to be organized along ethnic lines, it is unclear based on 
interviews alone whether responses to trafficking exhibit discrimination based on ethnicity. 
Literature review would support this assessment of discriminatory enforcement by the state 
based on longstanding historical precedents. Interviews, however, disputed this notion. 
Regardless, ethnic issues remain a sensitive issue within the Kyrgyz Republic.  
 Finally, this thesis demonstrates that there are distinct spatial aspects to how the 
processes of trafficking, and responses manifest. In one sense, they are tied to issues of state 
capacity within the republic – with capacity itself a byproduct of political-geographic space. 
Challenges to state capacity in-turn mean challenges to counter-narcotics efforts. Likewise, 
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counter-narcotics efforts present a challenge to state capacity through official corruption, the 
reinforcement of center-periphery relations, and the tolerance of powerful non-state actors who 
may pose a threat to the state on a local or regional scale. These issues with capacity are innately 
tied to development of political-geographic space in the republic.  
Key Considerations and Future Research 
 Beyond providing a brief conclusion of research findings, it is necessary to note key 
considerations and areas for future research. Concerning these considerations, this thesis operates 
under the assumption that it presents an extremely limited view of an extremely complex 
criminal environment and political-geographic landscape. This is a byproduct of research design, 
fieldwork, and the two-year scope of this project. Future work would be well-served to 
incorporate broader and more extensive fieldwork including more in-country travel and 
interviews as well as focus-groups. Future work may also seek to broaden focus to the 
transportation networks along which illicit goods are trafficked – as was suggested during field 
interviews as well as the defense of this thesis.411 In the case of Kyrgyzstan, networks which may 
serve as the basis for future analysis consist primarily of surface roads (See Appendix C). 
Finally, the safety considerations for future work should not be understated. While this 
researcher encountered no significant safety issues during field research, the topics investigated 
remain sensitive within the Kyrgyz Republic. Any future work in Central Asia anticipates more 
robust safety considerations.  
 Considering future directions of research, this thesis asserts that there are several areas 
within geography which warrant further inquiry. This includes building upon Geography of 
                                                 
411 Anonymous US Official, Interview - Anonymous US Official. 
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Drugs literature outside the context of Latin America, where there is already significant 
scholarship. While this thesis does not claim to fall within the purview of critical geography, 
future work could benefit from incorporating critical-geographic approaches. This is particularly 
with regards to examining discourses of the Eurasian drug trade as they pertain to the geopolitics 
of security and securitization. Future critical work would likewise benefit in applying critical 
discourses of the “War on Drugs,” to the Eurasian drug trade.  
 Beyond drug geographies, political geography would be well-served to devote efforts to 
scholarship on state capacity. While this research benefited from examining state capacity from 
the perspective of other social science disciplines, the dearth of work in political geography on 
state capacity is surprising. In this sense, political geography and its focuses can bring valuable 
perspective to broader social science discourses on capacity by emphasizing the role of space and 
territory as aspects of capacity, among other considerations.  
 Broader inquiry in geography could also benefit by expanding the geographic scope of 
this research to other countries in Southwest and Central Asia and North Africa. Unfortunately, 
depending on the location the challenges of safety and access increase significantly. Likewise, as 
noted in Chapter V, trafficking in synthetic narcotics represents a comparatively understudied 
field of inquiry. Geography would be well served to capitalize on the current lack of scholarship 
on trafficking in synthetic narcotics, especially in Southwest and Central Asia and North Africa.  
 Finally, this thesis should make clear that corruption and state crime prove more pressing 
to issues of state capacity in Central Asia than narcotics trafficking – despite the close linkages 
between the two. Much like state capacity, political geographies of corruption and state-crime 
appear to be lacking. This thesis suggests that political geography would be well served at 
devoting scholarship to examining political geographies of corruption and state-crime in Central 
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Asia and elsewhere. While these topics present challenges of safety and access, future research in 
these subject areas is both warranted and justified given the current lacunae. Such work would be 
well represented within political geography as well as regional studies of Southwest and Central 
Asia. As is demonstrated, such work would likewise provide a valuable resource for informing 
current and future policy debates on Central Asia – particularly those which pertain to counter-
narcotics, aid, and development. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Table of Acronyms 
APC Armored Personnel Carrier 
AUCA American University of Central Asia 
BRI Belt and Road Initiative 
CSO Civil Society Organization 
CPK Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan 
DDK Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan 
IGO International Governmental Organization 
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
IRP Islamic Renaissance Party (Tajikistan) 
MoIA Ministry of Internal Affairs (Kyrgyz Republic) 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NPS New Psychotropic Substances; Synthetic Narcotics 
stat.kg National Statistics Committee for the Kyrgyz Republic 
SWANA Southwest Asia and North Africa 
UN United Nations 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; The Soviet Union 
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Appendix B: Map of the Central Asia - 2002412 
412 “Russia and the Former Soviet Republics Maps - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection - UT Library Online,” 
accessed April 18, 2019, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth.html#K. 
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Appendix C: Map of the Kyrgyz Republic - 2005413 
413 “Kyrgyzstan Maps - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection - UT Library Online,” accessed April 18, 2019, 
https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kyrgyzstan.html. 
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Appendix D: Ethnic Diversity in the Kyrgyz Republic (2017)414 
Ethnicity Percentage of Population 
Kyrgyz 73.2% 
Uzbek 14.6% 
Russian 5.8% 
Other* 6.4% 
*“Other” includes Dungan, German, Kazakh, Korean, 
Tajik, Tatar, Turk, Ukrainian, and Uyghur* 
414 “World Factbook - Kyrgyzstan.” 
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Appendix E: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in the Kyrgyz Republic (2009)415 
415 Bond and Koch, “Interethnic Tensions in Kyrgyzstan.” 
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Appendix F: 2010 Violence in Osh 
Osh’s Prominent Lenin statue – located outside city offices –  
during the violence of 2010 June (top)416 and during 2018 July (bottom; Photo by Author) 
416 VOA News, Fourth Day of Ethnic Violence in Kyrgyzstan. 
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Appendix G: Police Corruption 
Kyrgyzstan’s traffic police are notoriously corrupt – often stopping motorists at random to extort 
bribes for speeding – actual or perceived – and other minor violations or infractions.417 In this 
case, the “extra trouble,” was included in the final taxi fare. (Photo by Author)  
417 Shishkin, Restless Valley. 
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Appendix H: Sheep and Ladas 
Sheep secured to the roof rack of a Lada sedan at a Saturday livestock market in Karakol 
(Photo by Author) 
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Appendix I: Views of Kyrgyz Citizens on the Collapse of the USSR418 
"It is a tragedy that 
the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist.” 
Totally 
agree 
Rather 
agree 
Rather 
disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Refused to 
answer 
Don’t 
know 
Kyrgyzstan (n=1000) 34.50% 17.45% 18.25% 23.47% 0.20% 6.12% 
Bishkek (n=178) 46.63% 15.17% 14.61% 8.99% 0.56% 14.04% 
Chui Oblast (n=138) 34.06% 13.77% 31.16% 15.22% 5.80% 
Issyk-Kul Oblast 
(n=87) 
41.38% 27.59% 13.79% 3.45% 1.15% 12.64% 
Naryn Oblast (n=47) 10.64% 8.51% 31.91% 48.94% 
Talas Oblast (n=46) 23.91% 30.43% 10.87% 34.78% 
Osh Oblast (n=191) 29.32% 14.14% 12.57% 38.74% 5.24% 
Jalal-Abad Oblast 
(n=183) 
43.96% 15.93% 18.13% 21.98% 
Batken Oblast (n=78) 19.23% 11.54% 17.95% 48.72% 2.56% 
Osh (n=51) 22.00% 42.00% 20.00% 6.00% 10.00% 
Male (n=493) 30.22% 15.01% 21.50% 27.59% 5.68% 
Female (n=507) 38.66% 20.12% 14.99% 19.33% 0.39% 6.51% 
25-35 y.o. (n=409 26.03% 16.55% 20.19% 29.20% 0.49% 7.54% 
36-45 y.o. (n=293) 34.93% 19.52% 17.81% 19.52% 8.22% 
46-60 y.o. (n=298) 45.48% 17.06% 15.72% 19.40% 0.33% 2.01% 
418 “The Central Asia Barometer.” 
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Appendix J: Manas 
Manas and the Kyrgyz national flag on Bishkek’s main square (Photo by Author) 
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Appendix K: IRB Approval 
173 
Appendix L: Drug Graffiti 
Examples of drug graffiti in Bishkek (top row, bottom row, center right) and Osh (center left; 
near tourist hostel) advertising synthetic narcotics for sale via encrypted messaging services. 
Tags affiliated with “@HORDE_KG” appeared outside the apartment of the author 
shortly before the conclusion of fieldwork. (Photos by Author)  
174 
Appendix M: Total Drug Seizures in 2011 & 2014419 
Data was provided by stat.kg; Bishkek and Osh Administrative Areas were excluded from this 
representation (Maps by Author) 
419 National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Stat.Kg.” 
